Justia ERISA Opinion Summaries

Appellant a former pilot for US Airways, sought benefits from a collectively-bargained pilot disability plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. On appeal, appellant challenged the district court's dismissal of his claim for lack of jurisdiction. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal because section 204 of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq., vested in the "applicable adjustment board" exclusive jurisdiction over appellant's claim because it was grounded in the application and interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. View "Oakey v. US Airways Pilots Disability Income Plan" on Justia Law

The Fund is a multi-employer trust fund under the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. 186, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. Blue Cross is a Michigan non-profit corporation; its enabling statute authorizes the State Insurance Commissioner to require it to pay a cost transfer of one percent of its “earned subscription income” to the state for use to pay costs beyond what Medicare covers. In 2002 the Fund converted to a self-funded plan, and entered into an Administrative Services Contract with Blue Cross, which states that Blue Cross is not the Plan Administrator, Plan Sponsor, or fiduciary under ERISA; its obligations are limited to processing and paying claims. In 2004 the Fund sued, claiming that Blue Cross breached ERISA fiduciary duties by imposing and failing to disclose a cost transfer subsidy fee to subsidize coverage for non-group clients. The fee was regularly collected from group clients. Self-insured clients were not always required to pay it. Following a first remand, the district court granted class certification and granted the Fund summary judgment. On a second remand, the court again granted judgment on the fee imposition claim and awarded damages of $284,970.84 plus $106,960.78 in prejudgment interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Pipefitters Local 636 Ins. Fund v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of MI" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former Lehman employees, filed suit alleging that defendants, members of the Benefits Committee, and the company's Directors, breached their duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. In regards to plaintiffs' claims that the Benefits Committee Defendants breached their duty of prudence in managing the company's employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), the court concluded that plaintiffs have not rebutted the Moench v. Robertson presumption because they failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the Benefits Committee Defendants knew or should have known that Lehman was in a "dire situation" based on information that was publicly available during the class period. In regards to plaintiffs' claims that the Benefits Committee Defendants breached their duty of disclosure, the publicly-known information available to defendants did not give rise to an independent duty to investigate Lehman's SEC filings prior to incorporating their content into a summary plan description issued to plan-participants. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining claims. View "In Re: Lehman Bros. ERISA Litig." on Justia Law

Parents appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that the antenuptial agreement between their son and his then-wife, Kathy L. Cox, was ineffective to waive Kathy's right to the funds in Michael's 401(k) plan. The son died before his divorce from Kathy was finalized. The parties agreed that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., governed the distribution of the funds in the plan. The court concluded that the son's designation of his Parents as beneficiaries of the plan must yield to Kathy's rights as a surviving spouse, agreeing with the district court that Kathy's consent did not satisfy the acknowledgment requirement of section 1055(c)(2)(A)(iii). View "MidAmerican v. Cox, Sr., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a class action suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., alleging various breaches of fiduciary duty to plan participants. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed Counts I and IV of the amended complaint which alleged that Idearc Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by allowing plan participants to buy and hold Idearc stock when it was no longer prudent to do so where the amended complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to overcome the "presumption of prudence" the court adopted in Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy Inc. The court also concluded that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's claim for inaccurate disclosures and nondisclosures (Count II) where plaintiff alleged no specific circumstance or specific injury mandating the Idearc Defendants disclose non-public information to plan participants and no general duty to disclose non-public information existed under ERISA or under the court's precedents. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Kopp v. Klein, et al." on Justia Law

After accumulating a fortune in the technology business, Patel became a hedge fund manager. He formed a fund, and Sitara to serve as the fund’s investment adviser, and named himself managing director of Sitara. His acquaintances purchased interests in the fund. After initial success, Patel invested $6.8 million, nearly all of the fund’s assets, in Freddie Mac common stock in 2008, after the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis. The fund incurred devastating losses. Owners of limited partnership interests sued Patel and Sitara, claiming federal and state securities fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent inducement. Their second amended complaint asserted only failure to register securities in violation of federal law, failure to register as an investment advisor under Illinois law, and breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1109(a). Plaintiffs sought to file a third amended complaint, based upon purported misrepresentations discovered while deposing Patel: an offering memorandum statement that Patel “intends to contribute no less than one hundred thousand dollars” and Patel’s oral statement that he was investing some of the $18 million from the sale of a former business at the inception of the fund. Patel did not invest any proceeds from the sale of his company at the inception. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The new claims suffered from deficiencies that rendered the proposed amendment futile. View "Shailja Gandhi Revocable Trust v. Sitara Capital Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit against Conoco for breach of the Offer Letter and breach of its obligations under a severance plan (the Plan). The court concluded that plaintiff waived any challenge to the Trustee's application of the common law presumption of integration or Texas's parol evidence rule; plaintiff's arguments regarding his change in title were unpersuasive; plaintiff's "at will" employment argument relied on outdated and out-of-context Texas authority and was unpersuasive; the waiver was not invalid and unenforceable on account of fraud in the inducement; plaintiff ratified an alleged fraud, thereby preserving the validity and enforceability of the waiver regardless by submitting a claim to Conoco Human Resources but then continuing to work at Conoco; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), civil enforcement provision "completely preempts" plaintiff's state law claims against Conoco and the district court did not err by denying plaintiff's first motion for remand; the district court correctly denied plaintiff's renewed motion for remand; plaintiff was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees; and plaintiff waived his claim for breach of the Offer Letter, pertaining to a substantial reduction in his post-merger job position and responsibilities, for failure to plead with specificity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff. View "Clayton v. ConocoPhillips Co., et al" on Justia Law

Engleson, vice president of an Akron insurance agency, suffered from medical conditions, including Crohn’s disease and depression. He resigned in 2001 and sought long-term disability benefits from the company’s group plan, managed by Unum. Unum denied his claim weeks later, reasoning that Engleson’s clinical documentation did not establish that his symptoms were so debilitating that he was precluded from working. Unum denied an appeal in October, 2001 and a second appeal with additional supporting information in November, 2001. In 2007, Engleson returned to Ohio and to the agency, but in August, 2008, he filed another claim for disability benefits. Unum granted his request, with the date of disability denoted as August 5, 2008. Unum would not provide additional appeal review of the 2001 claim. Engleson filed suit in 2009, under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, alleging that he was not afforded a full and fair review of his claim and that Unum breached its fiduciary duties. The district court held that the three-year contractual limitations period barred the suit with respect to his 2001 claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the untimely filing was not excusable. View "Engleson v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Employees of Solvay Chemicals, Inc. brought an ERISA claim against the company for what they contended was improper notice with regard to changes in the company retirement program. At one time the company offered a defined benefit plan, but changed it to a "cash balance" plan that required a defined contribution from the company (rather than defined payments to employees). While the Tenth Circuit held that the company violated its notice obligations with regard to preexisting early retirement subsidies, the notice was sufficient in all other respects. As remedy for the defective notice, employees asked that the company revert back to the abandoned defined benefit plan. The district court found that the company's notice failure was not "egregious" to grant the employees' requested relief. The employees appealed the district court's denial of their request. Agreeing that the employees were not entitled to their requested relief, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Jensen, et al v. Solvay Chemicals, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Union members, working at Navistar’s Indianapolis engine-manufacturing plant, were represented by a union and were subject to a collective-bargaining agreement. They claim that on unidentified dates they were laid off, ostensibly for lack of work, but that Navistar actually subcontracted their work to nonunion plants in violation of the CBA and that Navistar failed to recall them as work became available. They claim to have filed hundreds of grievances that were diverted or stalled. In 2009, Navistar closed the Indianapolis plant. The union members sued. When union members sue their employer for breach of contract under the Labor Management Relations Act, 28 U.S.C. 185, they must also claim breach of their union’s duty of fair representation. The district court dismissed, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately plead the prerequisite union breach of fair representation. A separate interference-with-benefits claim under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, was resolved by summary judgment in favor of Navistar. The 29 remaining plaintiffs appealed only the LMRA claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that all of the allegations concerning the duty of fair representation were conclusory, so that the complaint lacked the required factual content. View "Yeftich v. Navistar, Inc." on Justia Law