Justia ERISA Opinion Summaries

The National Labor Relations Board found that HH3 Trucking had committed unfair labor practices and ordered back pay for its workers. HH3 failed to comply. The NLRB petitioned for judicial enforcement. HH3 did not reply to the petitions. The Seventh Circuit we enforced the orders summarily. HH3’s liability is $190,000 plus interest. After finding that HH3’s owners, the Hudsons, could comply but had chosen not to do so, the court held the Hudsons in civil contempt, and ordered them to pay at least $600 a month until the full judgment had been satisfied. Nothing happened. The court directed the Marshals Service to place the Hudsons in custody until they paid. They promised compliance and were released. They paid $600, then stopped. They went back to jail. After they asserted that they are no longer able to comply, the court allowed them to be transferred to home confinement and investigated. Finding that, although Gretchen Hudson considers herself retired and William Hudson had (recently) become medically unable to work, they remain able to pay something by drawing on savings and sources of current income that include benefits from a retirement plan. They argued that money received from a pension plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), as their plan is, is free of all legal claims by third parties, 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(1). The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument and, noting that the “scofflaws” have begun to receive Social Security benefits, which themselves exceed $600 monthly, ordered them to pay at least that amount. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. HH3 Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his claims against the Fund and others under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. For over three years, the Fund paid plaintiff monthly pension benefits he had not earned. This case arose from the events that occurred after the Fund discovered the error. The court concluded that it was bound by its own precedent, which correctly identifies surcharge as including only unjust enrichment and losses to the trust estate; the district court properly concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to relief based on estoppel as a matter of law; equitable remedies were not available to plaintiff where the order plaintiff sought necessarily would require violating the terms of the Plan by deeming an ineligible person to be eligible for pension benefits; and the surcharge remedy plaintiff sought would not restore the trust estate, but rather would wrongfully deplete it by paying him benefits he is not eligible to receive under the Plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's breach of fiduciary and co-fiduciary duty claims under section 1132(a)(3). The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the Fund failed to comply with ERISA procedural requirements, or that it waived its determination that plaintiff never vested. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's deference to the Fund's denial of benefits. View "Gabriel v. Alaska Electrical Pension Fund, et al." on Justia Law

This case concerned a plumbers and pipefitters union ("the Union"), which established employee benefits plans. Among the pension benefits promised to Union employees were "banked hour" benefits, which were retroactively conferred during the course of employment. The Pension Trust sought to eliminate the benefits in an attempt to meet its obligations to a larger group of plan participants. Plaintiffs, now-retired union employees, filed this action against the Trustees, alleging that the cuts, which were effectuated through a plan amendment, violated the anti-cutback provisions ERISA, which protects "accrued benefits" against reduction by amendment. The district court entered summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' benefits were in fact "accrued" and that the plan amendment, if implemented, would violate the anti-cutback provisions of ERISA. View "Bonneau v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union 51 Pension Trust Fund" on Justia Law

After discovering that she had lung cancer that had spread to her brain, Killian underwent aggressive treatment on the advice of her doctor. The treatment was unsuccessful and she died. Her husband submitted medical bills for the cost of the treatments to her health insurance company. The company denied coverage on most of the expenses because the provider was not covered by the insurance plan network. The husband filed suit, seeking benefits for incurred medical expenses, relief for breach of fiduciary duty, and statutory damages for failure to produce plan documents. The district court dismissed denial-of-benefits and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, but awarded minimal statutory damages against the plan administrator. In 2012, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals, rejecting an argument that the plan documents were in conflict, but remanded for recalculation of the statutory damages award. On rehearing, en banc, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of benefits and statutory penalties holdings, but reversed on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. The instructions given in plan documents were deficient and a reasonable trier of fact could rule in favor of Killian, based on telephone conversations in which Killian attempt to determine whether the physicians who were about to perform surgery were within the network.View "Killian v. Concert Health Plan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of individuals who participated in the Morgan Stanley 401(k) Plan and the Morgan Stanley Employee Stock Ownership Plan, filed suit alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. In January 2007 and 2008, Morgan Stanley elected to make its employer contributions to the Plans in the form of Company Stock instead of cash. After the stock price plunged in conjunction with the broader economic downturn, plaintiffs sought to recover for losses the Plans suffered as a result of the drop in stock price. The Moench "presumption of prudence" is a pleading standard that presumes plan fiduciaries act in "compliance with ERISA when [a plan] fiduciary invests assets in the employer's stock." The district court found that the Moench presumption of prudence applied to defendants' conduct and that plaintiffs failed to rebut this presumption. The court affirmed the district court's motion to dismiss on the district court's alternative ground because the challenged conduct, even if it negatively impacted the Plans, did not occur in the performance of a fiduciary function and therefore could not trigger fiduciary liability under ERISA. Absent fiduciary liability, plaintiffs' secondary claims also failed. View "Coulter, et al. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Pilots appealed the grant of summary judgment to PBGC on their claims regarding pension benefits payable under the terminated Retirement Income Plan for U.S. Airways Pilots. The court concluded that it need not resolve the parties' contentions regarding whether the PBGC was entitled to deference under Chevron when it acts as the trustee in an involuntary retirement plan termination; regardless, Pilots' claims relating to the PBGC's interpretation of 29 U.S.C. 1344 and regulations must fail; the court need not decide the level of deference due to the PBGC's interpretation of the Plan provisions because Pilots have not demonstrated Article III standing for part of one claim and their other claims failed regardless of the standard; and the court need not decide whether the decision in Davis v. PBGC regarding Pilots' request for a preliminary injunction was the law of the case on the standard of review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Davis, et al. v. PBGC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees of Antioch, participated in an employee stock ownership, plan (ESOP). In 2003, Antioch borrowed money to buy back all stock except the stock owned by the ESOP. The buy-out left Antioch bankrupt and ESOP worthless. Plaintiffs filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, claiming breach of fiduciary duties. The district court granted the defendants summary judgments. The presumptive limitation period for violations is six years from the date of the last action constituting part of the breach or violation, but the time is shortened to three years from the time the plaintiff gained “actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” Applying the three-year limitations period, section 1113(2), the court reasoned that proxy documents given to plaintiffs at the time of the buy-out and their knowledge of Antioch’s financial affairs after the transaction gave them actual knowledge of the alleged ERISA violations. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The claims for breach of fiduciary duty do not depend only on the disclosed substantive terms of the 2003 transaction, but also depend on the processes used to evaluate, negotiate, and approve the transaction. Plaintiffs’ knowledge of the substantive terms of the buyout, therefore did not give them “actual knowledge of the breach or violation” alleged in this case. View "Fish v. Greatbanc Trust Co." on Justia Law

Hi-Lex has about 1,300 employees. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM) served as a third-party administrator (TPA) for Hi-Lex’s Health and Welfare Benefit Plan since 1991. Under the Administrative Services Contracts (ASCs) between the parties, BCBSM agreed to process healthcare claims for Hi-Lex employees and grant those employees access to BCBSM’s provider networks. BCBSM received an “administrative fee” set forth in ASC Schedule A on a per-employee, per month basis. In 1993, BCBSM implemented a new system, “retention reallocation,” to retain additional revenue. Regardless of the amount BCBSM was required to pay a hospital for a given service, it reported a higher amount that was then paid by the self-insured client. Hi-Lex allegedly was unaware of the retention reallocation until 2011, when BCBSM disclosed the fees in a letter and described them as “administrative compensation.” Hi-Lex sued, alleging breach of fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1104(a). The court awarded Hi-Lex $5,111,431 in damages and prejudgment interest of $914,241. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that: BCBSM was an ERISA fiduciary and breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA section 1104(a), that BCBSM conducted “self-dealing” in violation of section 1106(b)(1), and that Hi-Lex’s claims were not time-barred. View "Hi-Lex Controls, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of MI" on Justia Law

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee “because he has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to [the Act],” 29 U.S.C. 1140. Sexton made a one-time unsolicited internal complaint to his employer about alleged violations of the ERISA, with respect to seating employees on the company’s board of directors. About six months later, the company fired Sexton from his job as a general manager. Sexton sued in Michigan state court for violating the state Whistleblower Protection Act and for breaching his employment contract. The company invoked complete preemption under ERISA and removed the case to federal court. Sexton did not challenge the company’s removal of the case or its use of complete preemption. The district court granted the company summary judgment on the ERISA claim and declined supplemental jurisdiction over Sexton’s breach-of-contract claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Sexton’s complaint did not amount to “giv[ing] information ... in any inquiry” under ERISA. View "Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against MetLife, alleging that MetLife abused its discretion in denying her claim to receive the proceeds of her late husband's life insurance policy under an employee-benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to MetLife. The court concluded based on the evidence - the 1991 form, the husband's will, and the November 2010 form - that MetLife did not abuse its discretion in determining that the husband's son, rather than plaintiff, was the beneficiary of the life insurance proceeds. Even assuming that the substantial-compliance doctrine was available to federal courts in the interpleader context, the court would not extend it to the circumstances presented here. Where an ERISA plan administrator is given discretion under the plan to determine eligibility for benefits, the doctrine does not deprive the administrator from requiring strict compliance with the terms of the plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hall v. Metropolitan Life Ins., et al." on Justia Law