Justia ERISA Opinion Summaries

The UMM Fund filed suit asserting three claims against the 210 Fund. The district court construed all three claims as pleading causes of action under section 502 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3)(B), which provides a federal civil cause of action to an ERISA plan fiduciary to obtain equitable relief for harms resulting from violations of the terms of an ERISA plan and ERISA. The court concluded that the Section 515 claim was properly dismissed because the 210 Fund is not an employer and the 210 Fund's payments to the UMM Fund were not made in the interest of an employer; the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the UMM Fund on its first two claims because the terms of each collective bargaining agreement (CBA) were not terms of an ERISA plan; and, although the UMM Fund has failed to state a claim under ERISA, the first two claims in the Amended Complaint can be construed as state law breach-of-contract claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Silverman v. Teamsters Local 210 Affiliated Health & Ins. Fund." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initially filed suit in state court seeking to enjoin defendant insurers under New York law from obtaining reimbursement of medical benefits from plaintiffs' tort settlements. Defendants removed to federal court where the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that plaintiffs' claims did not satisfy the Supreme Court's test for being subject to complete Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., preemption, which would have conferred federal subject-matter jurisdiction; such jurisdiction exists, however, under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d); therefore, the court reached the merits of the express preemption defense and concluded that N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law 5-335 is saved from express preemption under ERISA section 514, as a law that "regulates insurance;" and therefore, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wurtz v. The Rawlings Co." on Justia Law

Employers that withdraw from underfunded multiemployer pension plans must pay their share of the shortfall. They can seek recalculation of the plans' assessment within 90 days, 29 U.S.C. 1399(b)(2)(A), and within another 60 days, may invoke a process that the Act calls arbitration, though it is neither contractual nor consensual. Central States Pension Fund concluded that US Foods has withdrawn in part and assessed liability in 2008 and in 2009. US Foods timely requested arbitration of the 2009 assessment, but did not timely seek arbitration of the 2008 assessment. In the Fund’s suit to collect the 2008 assessment, US Foods asked the court to order the arbitrator to calculate the amount due for 2008 and 2009 jointly. The court ruled that US Foods had missed the deadline for arbitral resolution of the 2008 assessment. US Foods appealed, relying on 9 U.S.C.16(a)(1)(B), which authorizes an interlocutory appeal from an order “denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed”. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. An order declining to interfere in the conduct of an arbitration is not an order “denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed” under section 16(a)(1)(B). View "Cent. States SE & SW Areas Pension Fund v. US Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, General Warehouse, an employer obligated to contribute to the Central States Pension Fund on behalf of certain employees ceased to have an obligation to the Fund, which led to a complete withdrawal, incurring withdrawal liability of $1,262,568. Under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. 1301(b)(1), if a withdrawing employer is unable to pay in full, a pension plan can recover the deficiency jointly and severally from any other business under common control with the withdrawing The Fund sued to collect from General Warehouse, GEOBEO and other businesses under common control. The parties entered into a consent judgment, acknowledging that the named defendants were jointly and severally liable. The Fund then initiated an action to add the defendants to the group of business entities from which it can collect. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Fund. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding “overwhelming evidence” that the entities were under common control. View "Cent. States, Southeast SE & SW Areas Pension Fund v. CLP Venture LLC" on Justia Law

The New Jersey Prevailing Wage Act, N.J. Stat. 34:11-56.25 (PWA) provides that laborers on certain public works projects are to be paid the prevailing wage. Carpenters hired to work on the Revel Casino Project in Atlantic City claimed that the Revel Casino Project is a “public work” within the meaning of the PWA because it received financial assistance in the form of incentives, tax exemptions, and tax reimbursements from the New Jersey Economic Development Authority (EDA), which, they argued is a “public body” within the meaning of the Act. They assigned their claims for unpaid prevailing wages to the plaintiffs, employee benefit plans within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, and trust funds within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 141. The district court held that the claims were completely preempted under ERISA section 502(a). Although it did not directly address LMRA complete preemption, the court also noted that the complaint “seeks interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.” The Third Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to remand to state court, holding that neither statute completely preempts the PWA. View "NJ Carpenters v. Tishman Constr. Corp. of NJ" on Justia Law

In 2008 Schane suffered a job-related injury while working for YRC. He drew workers’ compensation benefits until he returned to work in 2009. Schane was medically cleared for light-duty work only, and with no light work available, he resumed workers’ compensation in 2010. YRC and its employees, including Schane, participate in a multi-employer benefit trust fund and an “employee pension benefit plan” within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. 1002(2). Schane submitted a pension application in July 2009, after returning from his first stint on workers’ compensation, but left blank the line on indicating his last day of work because the plan does not permit participants to take a pension while they are receiving workers’ compensation. The following March, Schane told the plan that his last day of work would be October 31, 2010. He later delayed his last day by a year. In September 2011, he delayed again. On December 21, he wrote that he would retire at the end of the year and that his pension should therefore be effective on January 1, 2012. Schane and the plan could not agree on the date that he “retired” for purposes of calculating benefits: August 2009 or December 2011. The district court rejected Schane’s argument. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, noting the trustees’ flimsy defense of their interpretation on appeal. View "Schane v. Int'l Bh of Teamsters Union Local No. 710" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Sun Life, alleging that Sun Life improperly denied him long-term disability benefits under a disability plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The court concluded that it was reasonable for Sun Life to conclude that plaintiff's vitamin A supplements constituted a "medical treatment." The court held that Sun Life did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's claim for benefits under the Plan, in light of an ordinary understanding of what constitutes a "medical treatment" and the purpose of the Pre-Existing Condition clause. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment to plaintiff and remanded for entry of summary judgment to Sun Life. View "Kutten v. Sun Life Assurance Co." on Justia Law

ABA Retirement, a not‐for‐profit corporation created by the American Bar Association to provide its members and their employees with a retirement plan qualified to take advantage of income tax benefits, created master retirement plans for adoption by lawyers and law firms. In 1999 ABA Retirement hired State Street Bank to act as sole Plan trustee. ABA Retirement directors ceased to be trustees. ABA Retirement still maintained the IRS‐approved master tax‐qualified retirement plans and acted as Plan fiduciary, with authority to engage, monitor, and fire its trustee. It was responsible for Plan documents (ensuring that they were tax‐qualified), oversight of vendors, contract negotiations, and approval of State Street’s marketing plan. State Street had authority to engage and fire investment advisors, but was required to consult with ABA Retirement. The Plan paid ABA Retirement a fee for its services in connection with the Program based on a percentage of l invested assets. ABA Retirement received the interest on the funds. In 2000, 2001, and 2002, ABA Retirement reported gross income of $1,601,217 to $1,861,258. Its taxable income for those years was $384,972 to $672,098; it held assets worth $3.5 million. On tax returns ABA Retirement described itself as an employee benefit fund, and its product as retirement plans. In 2004 ABA retirement sought tax‐exempt status. In 2005, the IRS determined that ABA Retirement did not qualify for the exemption. ABA Retirement filed claims for refunds on taxes it paid from 2000-2002; those were denied. ABA Retirement filed suit, arguing that it was a tax‐exempt “business league” under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6), from 2000 to 2002, and entitled to a refund. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "ABA Ret. Funds v. United States" on Justia Law

The City of Quincy passed an ordinance demanding that bidders on municipal public works projects engage in a specific type of apprentice training program. Plaintiffs, a trade association of construction companies and two of its members, sued the City in federal district court asserting that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempted the ordinance’s apprentice training requirement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and granted Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney fees under ERISA’s fee-shifting provision. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment but reversed the fee award, holding (1) the reach of ERISA’s preemption provision extends to the ordinance at issue; and (2) because there was no appropriate “participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary” to whom fees could lawfully be awarded in this case, the fee award must be set aside. Remanded. View "Merit Constr. Alliance v. City of Quincy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of RBC who participated in a wealth accumulation plan (WAP), filed suit alleging that forfeitures of their plan amounted to violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The court reversed the district court's grant of RBC's motion for summary judgment, concluding that, under the plain language of the statute and the interpretations expressed in Murphy v. Inexco Oil Co. and Boos v. AT&T, WAP is an "employee pension benefit plan" under section 1002(2)(A)(ii) and nothing in section 2510.3-2(c) proves otherwise. View "Tolbert, et al. v. RBC Capital Markets Corp., et al." on Justia Law