Justia ERISA Opinion Summaries

In these consolidated appeals, plaintiffs claimed that defendants breached their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, et seq. While the appeals were pending, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Tibble v. Edison International, which held that a plaintiff can effectively allege that a defendant breached its duty of prudence under ERISA "by failing to properly monitor investments and remove imprudent ones[,] . . . [and] so long as the alleged breach of the continuing duty occurred within six years of suit, the claim is timely." The parties agreed that these cases should be remanded in light of Tibble. The court agreed and therefore vacated the judgments and remanded for further proceedings. The court declined to reassign the case to a new district judge. View "Pruitt v. Suntrust Banks, Inc." on Justia Law

After PSI stopped contributing to the Fund, a multiemployer pension benefit plan governed by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., the Fund informed PSI that it owed "withdrawal liability" pursuant to section 1381. The Fund filed suit against PSI after PSI failed to pay the sum owed. The court affirmed the judgment, finding that the district court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction, venue was proper in Virginia, and PSI bound itself to make contributions to the Fund. View "Trustees of the Plumbers v. Plumbing Svc." on Justia Law

Kienstra, a Missouri resident, received treatment for uterine fibroid tumors at the Mayo Clinic in 2008. Her health plan concluded that her treatment fell outside the plan's coverage as experimental and requiring prior approval. Internal appeals failed. The plan is a self-funded multiple employer plan, maintained pursuant to collective bargaining agreements, and subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1002(1). The plan specified that any civil action for wrongful denial of medical benefits under ERISA must be filed within two years of the final date of denial. Kienstra filed suit almost two and a half years after she learned her claim had been denied. She unsuccessfully argued that the contractual limitations period was invalid because the plan's rules of construction stated that its terms should be read to comply with Missouri law, that a 10-year Missouri statute of limitations governed, and that a separate statute barred contracting parties from shortening that limitations period. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. There is no conflict between the plan's contractual limitations period and Missouri law; state law does not "apply of its own force to a suit based on federal law—especially a suit under ERISA, with its comprehensive preemption provision." View "Munro-Kienstra v. Carpenters' Health & Welfare Trust Fund of St. Louis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., seeking disgorgement from an employer who wrongly transferred assets from a pension plan that enjoyed a separate account feature to a pension plan that lacked one. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that plaintiffs lacked statutory and Article III standing. The court held, however, that a defined contribution plan’s separate account feature constitutes an “accrued benefit” that “may not be decreased by amendment of the plan” under section 204(g)(1). In this case, the transfers at issue resulted in a loss of the separate account feature and thus violated section 204(g)(1). Therefore, plaintiffs have statutory standing. Further, plaintiffs have Article III standing where plaintiffs incurred an injury in fact, and satisfied the causation and redressability requirements. Finally, the court joined the majority of its sister circuits and held that the transferor court’s choice-of-law rules apply when a case has been transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Here, the court concluded that the statute of limitations cannot serve as a basis for affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Bank. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pender v. Bank of America Corp." on Justia Law

The Hospital filed an interpleader action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., to resolve competing claims by Barbara Nicholls and Clair Nicholls to certain funds held in the four retirement and pension plans of the late Harold Nicholls. Barbara is Harold's surviving spouse and Claire is Harold's former spouse. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Claire because the divorce settlement agreement constitutes a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). The court found that the divorce settlement agreement does not constitute a QDRO because the agreement fails to comply with the requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(C); however, the nunc pro tunc orders constitute valid QDROs that assign funds to Claire from the three retirement and pension plans named in the orders; but because the nunc pro tunc orders do not clearly specify the fourth plan, the orders do not assign funds from that plan to Claire. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Nicholls" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., seeking a pension based on permanent disability. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion based on the ground that the Pension Plan gave defendants discretion to determine an applicant's eligibility for pension benefits and that defendants' reliance on SSA determinations, policies, and procedures in this matter was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court rejected plaintiff's contentions that the real decisionmaker on her benefits applications was the SSA and that the Trustees exercised no discretion but simply rubber-stamped SSA decisions. The court concluded that the district court properly reviewed the Trustees' denial of plaintiff's application under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. Further, the record also provides no support for plaintiff's contention that the Trustees' denial of her application for a permanent-disability pension was arbitrary and capricious. The court concluded that all of plaintiff's arguments are without merit and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Ocampo v. Building Service 32B-J Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against AETNA under the civil enforcement provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132. AETNA had denied plaintiff's application for continued long-term disability benefits and allowed plaintiff to file an internal appeal within 180 days. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court reversed, holding that because the last day of the appeal period fell on a Saturday, neither that day nor Sunday count in the computation of the 180 days. In this case, because plaintiff mailed his notice of appeal on Monday, it was timely. The court concluded that this method of counting time is widely recognized and furthers the goals and purposes of ERISA. and therefore, the court adopted it as part of ERISA’s federal common law. View "LeGras v. AETNA Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner, the former State director of United Public Workers, AFSCME Local 646, FL-CIO (UPW) and a former administrator of UPW’s Mutual Aid Fund trust (MAF), was held liable by a federal district court for negligently making loans under ERISA and thus breaching his fiduciary duties to the MAF. The court entered judgment against Petitioner in the amount of $850,000. Petitioner filed a complaint in the circuit court requesting that UPW indemnify him for the $850,000 on the grounds that his liability to the MAF arose from actions he took solely in his capacity as agent for UPW and/or that UPW ratified his actions. The circuit court granted summary judgment for UPW. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that because Petitioner was responsible for his own conduct, he was not entitled to be indemnified for his negligent acts as a matter of law. Petitioner requested certiorari, claiming that the ICA erred in concluding that his negligence claim defeated his indemnification claim as a matter of law. The Supreme Court denied certiorari without reaching this issue, holding that ERISA preemption, not Petitioner’s negligence, defeated Petitioner’s state indemnity claims against UPW as a matter of law. View "Rodrigues v. United Public Workers, AFSCME Local 646" on Justia Law

Orr died in a motorcycle accident. His daughters sought benefits under a group life insurance policy governed by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act and issued by USIC to Orr’s former employer. The policy provided accidental death, subject to exclusions, including one for loss resulting “directly or indirectly from … intoxication[.]” USIC asserted that Orr’s death resulted from his intoxication. The letter explained that autopsy and toxicology reports revealed that Orr’s blood alcohol level at the time of the accident exceeded the legal limit and that USIC’s medical consultant opined that Orr “would have been impaired in attention, coordination, and balance,” as a result. The letter advised the Orrs of their right to seek review and included a copy of USIC’s Life Claims Denial Review Procedure, stating, in boldfaced, all-caps print, that a request for review must be submitted in writing within 60 days and warning: “If … you do not complete both the first and second review before filing a lawsuit, a court can dismiss your lawsuit.“ The document encourages claimants to call with any questions. The Orrs filed suit before completing the review process. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of USIC on grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Orr v. Assurant Emp. Benefits" on Justia Law

In 2007, beneficiaries of the Edison 401(k) Savings Plan sued Plan fiduciaries, to recover damages for alleged losses suffered because of alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. The beneficiaries claimed violations with respect to mutual funds added to the Plan in 1999 and mutual funds added to the Plan in 2002, by acted imprudently in offering higher priced retail-class mutual funds as Plan investments when materially identical lower priced institutional-class mutual funds were available. Because ERISA requires a breach of fiduciary duty complaint to be filed no more than six years after “the date of the last action which constitutes a part of the breach or violation” or “in the case of an omission the latest date on which the fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation,” 29 U.S.C. 1113, the district court found the complaint as to the 1999 funds untimely. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that beneficiaries had not established a change in circumstances that might trigger an obligation to conduct a full due diligence review of the funds within the six-year period. A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. ERISA’s fiduciary duty is derived from the common law of trusts, which provides that a trustee has a continuing duty, separate from the duty to exercise prudence in initially selecting investments, to monitor, and remove imprudent trust investments. So long as a claim alleging breach of the continuing duty of prudence occurred within six years of suit, the claim is timely. The Court remanded for the Ninth Circuit to consider claims that the fiduciaries breached their duties within the relevant 6-year statutory period, considering analogous trust law. View "Tibble v. Edison Int’l" on Justia Law