Justia ERISA Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
by
Appellant was placed on disability leave from work. Appellant was covered under a long term disability (LTD) policy that her employer obtained from Medical Group Insurance Services (MGIS). The policy was written by Sun Life Assurance Company (Sun Life). After leaving her job, Appellant filed a claim with MGIS seeing long term disability benefits. Sun Life denied Appellant's request for benefits. Appellant filed an action against Sun Life, asserting various state law claims. The federal district court dismissed the action based on ERISA preemption. Appellant then amended her complaint to add ERISA claims and asked the district court to apply de novo review in its evaluation of her ERISA claims. The court denied the motion and granted summary judgment for Sun Life, concluding that Sun Life's decision to deny benefits was not arbitrary and capricious, and thus complied with ERISA's requirements. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding (1) the safe harbor exception to ERISA did not apply to the policy covering Appellant, and therefore, Appellant's state law claims were preempted; but (2) the benefits denial was subject to a de novo review, rather than the highly deferential "arbitrary and capricious" review prescribed for certain ERISA benefits decisions. Remanded. View "Gross v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada" on Justia Law

by
Retirees, dependents of retirees, and the union filed a class action suit against the retirees’ former employer, M&G, after M&G announced that they would be required to make health care contributions. The district court found M&G liable for violating a labor agreement and an employee welfare benefit plan and ordered reinstatement of the plaintiffs to the current versions of the benefits plans they were enrolled in until 2007, to receive health care for life without contributions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly concluded that the retirees’ right to lifetime healthcare vested upon retirement after concluding that documents, indicating agreement between the union and the employers to “cap” health benefits and several “side” letters were not a part of the applicable labor agreements. View "Tackett v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC," on Justia Law

by
Like many Michigan municipalities, Pontiac has experienced significant economic difficulties, especially since 2008. Michigan’s Governor appointed Schimmel as Pontiac’s emergency manager. Acting under Michigan’s then-existing emergency manager law (Public Act 4), in 2011, Schimmel modified the collective bargaining agreements of Pontiac’s retired employees and modified severance benefits, including pension benefits, that Pontiac had given retirees not covered by collective bargaining agreements. The retired employees claim that Schimmel and Pontiac violated their rights under the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Bankruptcy Clause. The district court denied the retirees an injunction. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for expedited consideration of state law issues. Michigan voters have since rejected Public Act 4 by referendum, which may have rendered Schimmel’s actions void.The court also questioned whether two-thirds of both houses of the Michigan Legislature voted to make Public Act 4 immediately effective. The court noted that similar issues face many Michigan municipalities. View "City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel" on Justia Law

by
Findlay sought relief from a withdrawal liability payment it allegedly owed the pension fund under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. 1381-1461. Findlay had ceased making contributions to a pension plan administered by the fund as the result of a labor dispute. About three months after the strike began, the fund demanded Findlay pay withdrawal liability of more than $10 million. Findlay contended that withdrawal liability was improper because withdrawal occurred as the result of a labor dispute; that despite the Act’s arbitration requirement, it should not be forced to arbitrate the dispute because the withdrawal was “union-mandated;” and that despite the Act’s interim payment requirement, it should not be forced to make interim payments because doing so would cause it to suffer irreparable harm. The district court dismissed, holding that the Act required the dispute be arbitrated, and enjoined the fund from collecting withdrawal liability payments pending arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but reversed the injunction, stating that creating an exception to interim payments for employers that would suffer irreparable harm would contradict the congressional purpose of protecting funds from undercapitalized or financially precarious employers. View "Findlay Truck Line, Inc. v. Cen. States SE & SW Areas Pension Fund" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001-1461, alleging that defendants violated ERISA when defendants, realizing that they had paid plaintiffs excess retirement benefits, reduced plaintiffs' monthly benefit payments and recouped overpayments through withholding. The court concluded that Count One of the complaint was time-barred; the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that defendants had no authority to either correct or recoup the benefit overpayments where the 2002 plan booklet contained broad language granting defendants such action; because the PPNPF was a defined-benefit plan, plaintiffs could not recover individualized relief in a section 1132(a)(2) claim; and plaintiffs' claim for equitable estoppel under section 1132(a)(3)(B) failed where this claim mirrored Count One's section 1132(a)(1)(B) claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Pilger, et al. v. Sweeney, et al." on Justia Law

by
Frazier, a sorter for Publishers Printing, was covered by Publishers’ employee benefit plan, which provided disability insurance. In 2009, at age 42, she left her job due to back pain that radiated down her legs, which she thought was caused by arthritis and a bulging disc, though she could not remember any fall or injury that initiated the pain. An MRI revealed mild disc dislocation. Her family physician diagnosed her with lower back pain and radiculopathy and in 2010 opined that Frazier was unable to return to work at regular capacity. Frazier participated in limited physical therapy. Another physician prescribed lumbar epidural injections and eventually permitted her to return to work. The plan denied Frazier’s claim for long-term disability benefits after reviewing medical evidence and job descriptions from Publishers and the U.S. Department of Labor. A Functional Capacity Evaluation indicated that Frazier “is currently functionally capable of meeting the lower demands for the Medium Physical Demand level on a 8 hour per day.” Frazier sued under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The district court granted judgment for the plan, reasoning that the administrator had discretion to deny Frazier’s claim, and that denial of benefits was not arbitrary. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Frazier v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am." on Justia Law

by
Reynolds acquired Pactiv in 2010 under an agreement that calls for severance pay to any non‐union employee terminated without cause, within a year, as a result of the acquisition. Pactiv established a severance‐pay plan with implementing terms, including a requirement that the departing worker execute a separation agreement in a form acceptable to the company, releasing all other claims against Pactiv. Within a year, Pactiv directed Rupert to relocate. He declined. Pactiv acknowledged entitlement to severance pay and sent him an agreement, which required that Rupert promise, for the next year, not to work for competitors in research and development, solicit sales of competing goods and services, or try to hire Pactiv employees. He had not previously been subject to a restrictive covenant and declined to sign. Pactiv withheld severance benefits. The district court held that Rupert was entitled to benefits because the formal plan, governed by ERISA, lacks any language conditioning benefits on signing a restrictive covenant; material terms must be in writing, 29 U.S.C.1102(a)(1). The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that Rupert did not ask for benefits under Pactiv’s plan, but asked for benefits under the acquisition agreement, repeatedly asserting that the plan is irrelevant to his claim. The court remanded for consideration under that agreement. View "Pactiv Corp. v. Rupert" on Justia Law

by
This case concerned the withdrawal liability for a pro rata share of unfunded vested benefits to a multiemployer pension fund of Scott Brass, Inc. (SBI), a bankrupt company. SBI had withdrawal pension obligations to the multiemployer pension fund (TPF), which sought to impose the obligations on two private equity funds (Plaintiffs). Plaintiffs asserted they were passive investors that indirectly controlled SBI and sought a declaratory judgment against the TPF. The TPF counterclaimed and sought payment of the withdrawal liability at issue. The district court entered summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, holding (1) at least one of the private equity funds that operated SBI sufficiently operated and was advantaged by its relationship with SBI, and further factual development was necessary as to the other equity fund; (2) the district court erred in entering summary judgment for Plaintiffs under the "trades or businesses" aspect of a two-part "control group" test under 29 U.S.C. 1301(b)(1); and (3) the district court correctly entered summary judgment for Plaintiffs on TPF's claim of liability on the ground that the funds had engaged in a transaction to evade or avoid withdrawal liability. Remanded. View "Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund" on Justia Law

by
The plant’s union and TRW negotiated collective bargaining agreements, which included provisions for healthcare benefits for retirees. The last CBA became effective in 1993 and was scheduled to expire in 1996. The plant closed in 1997. TRW and the union entered into a termination agreement that provided that any beneficiary, who is receiving or entitled to receive any payment and/or benefit under the CBA, “shall continue to receive or be entitled to receive such payment and/or benefit as though the CBA and Pension Plan had remained in effect.” In 2011, TRW terminated prescription drug coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees, replacing it with an annual contribution to a health reimbursement account. Plaintiffs claimed that this change modified their benefits in violation of TRW’s contractual obligation and filed a purported class action under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a), and a claim for benefits under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). The district court granted TRW’s motion to compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the two named Plaintiffs, declining to address the rights of hypothetical plaintiffs. View "VanPamel v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

by
Appellant a former pilot for US Airways, sought benefits from a collectively-bargained pilot disability plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. On appeal, appellant challenged the district court's dismissal of his claim for lack of jurisdiction. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal because section 204 of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq., vested in the "applicable adjustment board" exclusive jurisdiction over appellant's claim because it was grounded in the application and interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. View "Oakey v. US Airways Pilots Disability Income Plan" on Justia Law