Justia ERISA Opinion Summaries

Alpine was an irrigation business owned by Robert from 1961 until it closed in 2009. Alpine was in arrears on pension fund payments to the Union. After a Joint Arbitration Board awarded it $56,269.97, the Union sought to compel the award under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(e)(1). During a deposition, Robert’s son, Jeffery, admitted his sole ownership of RWI and JV, which were established upon Alpine’s closing. Like Alpine, RWI services and installs lawn irrigation systems. JV’s sole business is leasing to RWI equipment that it purchased from Alpine. RWI operates out of Jeffery’s home, Alpine’s prior business address; all but one of RWI’s employees worked for Alpine. Almost all of RWI’s customers are former Alpine customers. The magistrate first denied the Union’s motion to impose judgment against RWI and JV as successors, but determined that the companies were successors under ERISA and that FRCP 25(c) provided an appropriate procedure and granted a motion to substitute. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the court properly applied the multifactor ERISA successorship test to find that an “interest” had been transferred within the meaning of FRCP 25(c) and properly resolved the motion without an evidentiary hearing.View "Sullivan v. Running Waters Irrigation, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, Andalex, alleging claims of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment under federal and state law, as well as claims that Andalex failed to notify her of her right to continuing health care coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. 1166 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Andalex and dismissed her claims. The court affirmed the district court's judgment except with respect to plaintiff's retaliation claims. Based on the discrepancies between the EEOC statement and subsequent testimony, a reasonable juror could infer that the explanation given by Andalex was pretextual, and that, coupled with the temporal proximity between the complaint and the termination, the complaint at issue was a but-for cause of defendant's termination. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to require denial of the summary judgment motion on the retaliation claims. View "Kwan v. The Andalex Group LLC" on Justia Law

In 2000, physicians and physician associations imitated a group of class actions against various providers of health plans, which were consolidated into a multidistrict litigation. This appeal involves this complex, twelve-year-old multidistrict litigation, a related multidistrict litigation pending in another federal district, and whether the district court reasonably interpreted the Settlement Agreement in the first action. The court affirmed the Injunction as to plaintiffs' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961, and antitrust claims and as to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., claims based on the denial or underpayment of benefits following the Settlement Agreement's Effective Date. On remand, the district court will need to determine which of plaintiffs' ERISA claims fall on the permissible side of the line, and reconsider the assessment of sanctions. View "Medical Assoc. of GA, et al. v. Wellpoint, Inc." on Justia Law

The National Labor Relations Board found that HH3 Trucking had committed unfair labor practices and ordered back pay for its workers. HH3 failed to comply. The NLRB petitioned for judicial enforcement. HH3 did not reply to the petitions. The Seventh Circuit we enforced the orders summarily. HH3’s liability is $190,000 plus interest. After finding that HH3’s owners, the Hudsons, could comply but had chosen not to do so, the court held the Hudsons in civil contempt, and ordered them to pay at least $600 a month until the full judgment had been satisfied. Nothing happened. The court directed the Marshals Service to place the Hudsons in custody until they paid. They promised compliance and were released. They paid $600, then stopped. They went back to jail. After they asserted that they are no longer able to comply, the court allowed them to be transferred to home confinement and investigated. Finding that, although Gretchen Hudson considers herself retired and William Hudson had (recently) become medically unable to work, they remain able to pay something by drawing on savings and sources of current income that include benefits from a retirement plan. They argued that money received from a pension plan covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), as their plan is, is free of all legal claims by third parties, 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(1). The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument and, noting that the “scofflaws” have begun to receive Social Security benefits, which themselves exceed $600 monthly, ordered them to pay at least that amount. View "Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. HH3 Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

This case concerned a plumbers and pipefitters union ("the Union"), which established employee benefits plans. Among the pension benefits promised to Union employees were "banked hour" benefits, which were retroactively conferred during the course of employment. The Pension Trust sought to eliminate the benefits in an attempt to meet its obligations to a larger group of plan participants. Plaintiffs, now-retired union employees, filed this action against the Trustees, alleging that the cuts, which were effectuated through a plan amendment, violated the anti-cutback provisions ERISA, which protects "accrued benefits" against reduction by amendment. The district court entered summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' benefits were in fact "accrued" and that the plan amendment, if implemented, would violate the anti-cutback provisions of ERISA. View "Bonneau v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union 51 Pension Trust Fund" on Justia Law

Pilots appealed the grant of summary judgment to PBGC on their claims regarding pension benefits payable under the terminated Retirement Income Plan for U.S. Airways Pilots. The court concluded that it need not resolve the parties' contentions regarding whether the PBGC was entitled to deference under Chevron when it acts as the trustee in an involuntary retirement plan termination; regardless, Pilots' claims relating to the PBGC's interpretation of 29 U.S.C. 1344 and regulations must fail; the court need not decide the level of deference due to the PBGC's interpretation of the Plan provisions because Pilots have not demonstrated Article III standing for part of one claim and their other claims failed regardless of the standard; and the court need not decide whether the decision in Davis v. PBGC regarding Pilots' request for a preliminary injunction was the law of the case on the standard of review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Davis, et al. v. PBGC" on Justia Law

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee “because he has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to [the Act],” 29 U.S.C. 1140. Sexton made a one-time unsolicited internal complaint to his employer about alleged violations of the ERISA, with respect to seating employees on the company’s board of directors. About six months later, the company fired Sexton from his job as a general manager. Sexton sued in Michigan state court for violating the state Whistleblower Protection Act and for breaching his employment contract. The company invoked complete preemption under ERISA and removed the case to federal court. Sexton did not challenge the company’s removal of the case or its use of complete preemption. The district court granted the company summary judgment on the ERISA claim and declined supplemental jurisdiction over Sexton’s breach-of-contract claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Sexton’s complaint did not amount to “giv[ing] information ... in any inquiry” under ERISA. View "Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the Chairman of the Trustees of the Rhode Island Bricklayers Benefits Funds (the Funds), sued Union Stone Inc., alleging that Union Stone had failed to pay the full amount of fringe benefit contributions due for work performed in Massachusetts and Connecticut by members of the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. After a trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the Funds, awarding the unpaid contributions, interest, and attorneys' fees. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) refusing to enforce a purported settlement agreement between the parties; (2) admitting certain evidence on the ground that it was tainted by violations of the discovery rules; (3) declined to impose sanctions; and (4) awarding interest and attorneys' fees.View "Enos v. Union Stone, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked until 2006, when the plant closed, and retired under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA); that provided that the employer would provide health insurance, either through a self-insured plan or under a group insurance policy and identified the employer’s contribution to the premium. The CBAs provided that the coverage an employee had at the time of retirement or termination at age 65 or older other than a discharge for cause “shall be continued thereafter provided that suitable arrangements for such continuation[] can be made… In the event… benefits … [are] not practicable … the Company in agreement with the Union will provide new benefits and/or coverages as closely related as possible and of equivalent value." In 2011 TRW (the employer’s successor) stated that it would discontinue group health care coverage beginning in 2012, but would be providing “Health Reimbursement Accounts” (HRAs) and would make a one-time contribution of $15,000 for each eligible retiree and eligible spouse in 2012, and in 2013, would provide a $4,800 credit to the HRAs for each eligible party. The HRAs shifted risk, and potentially costs, to plaintiffs. TRW did not commit to funding the HRAs beyond 2013. Plaintiffs sued, claiming that the change breached the CBAs, in violation of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The district court certified a class and granted summary judgment, ruling that the CBAs established a commitment to lifetime health care benefits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed View "United Steel, Paper, Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union v. Kelsey-Hayes Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was hired by Employer in 1983. Plaintiff was covered by a short-term disability plan, and the Life Insurance Company of North America (“LINA”) had the authority to decide questions of eligibility for coverage or benefits under the plan. After Plaintiff underwent back surgery in 2009, LINA at first granted but then denied Plaintiff disability benefits. In 2010, Plaintiff sued LINA, Employer, and others in Puerto Rico court, seeking review of the benefits denial. LINA later removed the action to the District of Puerto Rico. Ultimately, the district court (1) found LINA’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious because Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient medical evidence of disability, and (2) dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against Employer for failure to plead it with specificity. Plaintiff appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal on procedural grounds because Plaintiff committed numerous procedural errors, which precluded intelligent review. View "Gonzalez-Rios v. Hewlett Packard PR Co." on Justia Law