Justia ERISA Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Family Law
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Defendant Beulah Jean James Moore ("Beulah") appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Billy Edward Moore ("Billy"), individually and as executor of the estate of his brother and Beulah's husband, Jimmy Lee Moore ("Jimmy"), in an action filed by Billy seeking the enforcement of a prenuptial agreement. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded summary judgment was appropriate. Beulah argued that language in the prenup discussing "spousal consents or waivers" granted her the proceeds of Jimmy's 401(k) plan and the pension plan unless a spousal waiver was executed . However, the Court found agreement made clear that Jimmy and Beulah agreed that the separate property each brought into the marriage--including the 401(k) plan and the pension plan--would remain separate. Jimmy and Beulah further agreed that neither of them would "claim, demand, assert any right to, take or receive any part of the property of the other as described on Schedules 1 and 2," which included the 401(k) plan and the pension plan. The second clause of section 4.4 allowed the owner of "an IRA or other plan account" to "direct" the "distribution of benefits" to one through a "beneficiary designation." Under this clause, Jimmy was permitted to name Billy as the designated beneficiary of the 401(k) plan and the pension plan, which he had done before he married Beulah, who had, in turn, renounced her claim to the plans. "Nothing in section 4.4 suggests that the failure to execute a spousal consent or waiver changes the parties' clear intent throughout the entire prenuptial agreement to renounce claims to the other's property; instead, the purpose of the requirement is to ensure that the parties' desires to retain control over the distribution of their accounts through a beneficiary designation is accomplished." Under those circumstances, Beulah breached the prenuptial agreement by retaining the benefits from the 401(k) plan and the pension plan. Thus, the trial court properly entered a summary judgment in favor of Billy. View "Moore v. Estate of Moore" on Justia Law

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Michael Easterday (“Decedent”) and Colleen Easterday (“Easterday”) married in 2004. Prior to marriage, Decedent worked for Federal Express and became a participant in a pension plan established by this former employer. He also purchased a $250,000 life insurance policy. Decedent designated Easterday the beneficiary of both during their marriage. The parties separated in 2013, and ultimately filed for divorce under section 3301(c) of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code, which provided for a divorce by mutual consent of the parties. She and Decedent subsequently settled their economic claims in a property settlement agreement (“PSA”) executed December, 2013. Pertinent here, the PSA provided that the parties would each retain "100% of their respective stocks, pensions, retirement benefits, profit sharing plans, deferred compensation plans, etc. and shall execute whatever documents necessary to effectuate this agreement." The issue this case presented was one of first impression for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, namely, the interplay between provisions of the Divorce Code, the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, and the Rules of Civil Procedure. An ancillary issue centered on whether ERISA preempted a state law claim to enforce a contractual waiver to receive pension benefits by a named beneficiary. It was determined Decedent’s affidavit of consent was executed more than thirty days prior to the date it was submitted for filing (and rejected). The Superior Court ruled that because the local Prothonotary rejected the filing of Decedent’s affidavit of consent due to a lack of compliance with Rule 1920.42(b)(2)’s thirty-day validity requirement, grounds for divorce had not been established in accordance with section 3323(g)(2) of the Divorce Code at the time of Decedent’s death. Because the Decedent’s affidavit of consent was not filed, section 6111.2 of the PEF Code did not invalidate Easterday’s designation as the beneficiary of Decedent’s life insurance policy. Furthermore, the Superior Court determined ERISA did not preempt the state law breach of contract claim to recover funds paid pursuant to an ERISA-qualified employee benefit plan. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. View "In Re: Estate of Easterday" on Justia Law

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Bruce and Bridget married in 1993. Their only child, Sierra, was born in 1995. In 2003, Bruce signed up for a life insurance plan sponsored by his employer and governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Bruce listed his uncle as the sole beneficiary. Bruce and Bridget divorced in 2006. Bruce died in 2013, insured for $48,000 in basic life insurance and $191,000 in optional life insurance. In their 2006 divorce decree, Bruce and Bridget agreed to maintain any employer-related life insurance policies for the benefit of Sierra until she turned 18 or graduated from high school. Bruce had not changed his beneficiary. The district court ordered payment to Sierra. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The divorce decree suffices as a qualified domestic relations order that, incorporating the Jacksons’ separation agreement and their shared parenting plan, “clearly specifies” Sierra as the beneficiary under 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(3)(C). Her parents’ (alleged) non-compliance with the decree does not limit Sierra’s rights under ERISA. View "Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff and Henry married in 1987 and divorced in 1993. The Divorce Judgment granted Plaintiff one-half of the pension benefits Henry had accrued during the marriage, with full rights of survivorship. Henry was forbidden from choosing a payment option that would deprive Plaintiff of these benefits. Henry worked for Chrysler from 1965 to 1992, and began receiving retirement benefits in 1994, under a “Lifetime Annuity Without Surviving Spouse” option, in violation of the Judgment. Plaintiff’s attorney submitted the Judgment to the Plan administrator, who stated that the Judgment lacked information required by 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(3)(C) to qualify as a “qualified domestic relations order,” so it could not override ERISA’s anti-alienation provision. Plaintiff did not contact the Plan again until after Henry had died in 2007. The Plan denied her benefits request, noting “the participant does not have a remaining benefit to be assigned.” For six years, Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to have the Plan qualify the Judgment. The Plan noted that changing the type of benefit was impermissible under plan the rules. In 2014, plaintiff obtained a nunc pro tunc order, correcting the Judgment. The Plan again denied benefits. Plaintiff filed suit under ERISA. The district court granted Plaintiff summary judgment, reasoning that, to the extent Plaintiff’s claim was based on the 2014, denial of benefits based on the Nunc Pro Tunc Order, it was timely and that the Order relates back to 1993. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the claim untimely. View "Patterson v. Chrysler Group, LLC" on Justia Law

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Appellant Linda Kesting obtained a judgment against Respondent James Kesting for breach of an alimony/spousal support agreement entered into during their divorce. When that judgment was returned without recovery, the magistrate judge issued a Judgment of Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”). The subsequent judgment was intended to allow recovery of the unpaid spousal support and associated attorney fees from James’ pension plan. James appealed to the district court, which reversed. The district court concluded that the QDRO was not valid because the spousal support agreement was not merged into the divorce decree and, therefore, the QDRO was not issued pursuant to the State’s domestic relations law as required under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Linda appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, "disagree[ing] with the district court’s narrow view of domestic relations law. [...] The policies underlying ERISA’s anti-assignment provisions would not be furthered by allowing a person to avoid his or her support obligation because that obligation was agreed to between the parties. [...] Regardless of whether a support obligation was created by court order or provided for by agreement, it was not Congress’s intent that ERISA be used as a tool for a person to evade his or her familial support obligations." View "Kesting v. Kesting" on Justia Law

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John and Melissa married in 1984. John enrolled in his employer’s retirement plan and designated Melissa as the beneficiary of a qualified joint and survivor annuity. John retired in 1994. The survivor annuity irrevocably vested in Melissa; John began receiving benefits. In2002, they divorced, agreeing to a decree awarding John all “benefits existing by reason of [John’s] past, present, or future employment.” John remarried and sought to designate his new wife as the survivor annuity beneficiary. The plan advised John that this designation would be permissible if done by qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) that would not require the plan to increase benefits beyond actuarial estimates of John’s and Melissa’s life expectancies, 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(3)(D). On John’s motion, a Texas court entered a purported QDRO divesting Melissa of all ownership interests in the survivor annuity. The employer terminated its pension plan. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) became the plan’s statutory trustee and determined that the supposed QDRO was invalid because it would require “a form of benefit, or [an] option, not otherwise provided under the plan” and because, unless waived in accordance with statutory procedures within 90 days, a spouse’s right to the survivor annuity irrevocably vests on the annuity start date. The district court upheld the determination and found John’s contract and unjust enrichment claims against Melissa preempted. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. View "Vanderkam v. Vanderkam" on Justia Law

Posted in: ERISA, Family Law
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Dr. Charles Dahl and Ms. Kim Dahl divorced in 2010. Ms. Dahl filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, alleging federal-law and state-law claims stemming from the terms of the divorce: (1) that Dr. Dahl improperly administered the pension trust of his medical practice to deny her funds and an accounting and (2) that her telephone conversations with the Dahls’ minor children were unlawfully monitored, recorded, and disclosed by Dr. Dahl, his attorney, and the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) in the divorce proceedings. The district court dismissed the federal-law pension claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and granted summary judgment against Ms. Dahl on the federal-law wiretapping claims. It then declined to exercise jurisdiction on the state-law claims. Ms. Dahl appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit: affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Ms. Dahl’s pension claims on the ground that the pension trust did not qualify as an employee benefit plan under ERISA, but that the claim should have been on the merits rather than for lack of jurisdiction. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects. View "Dahl v. Dahl, et al" on Justia Law

Posted in: ERISA, Family Law
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At the time of his divorce from Wife, Husband was a participant in a pension fund (Fund). To enforce the interest awarded to her under the decree, Wife needed to serve a domestic relations order (DRO) on the Fund and its administrators (collectively, the Plan) for qualification. Before Wife served any DRO on the Plan, Husband remarried. At the time of Husband's retirement, he made a survivor annuity payable to his current spouse upon his death. Wife eventually served a DRO on the Plan in 2005, but the Plan refused to qualify the DRO. After Husband died, Wife brought a motion to enforce the 2005 DRO. The district court ruled in favor of Wife, concluding (1) surviving spouse benefits do not vest in a plan participant's current spouse at the time of the plan participant's retirement; and (2) therefore, the 2005 DRO served on the Plan was a qualified domestic relations order. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under ERISA, surviving spouse benefits vest in a plan participant's current spouse at the time of the plan participant's retirement; and (2) accordingly, the 2005 DRO in this case could not be qualified.View "Langston v. Wilson McShane Corp." on Justia Law

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Appellee, as executrix of the estate of her father, and her sister, brought a breach of contract action in which they asserted that their father's second wife, appellant, contractually waived her right to retain the proceeds of their deceased father's employer-provided 401K plan and life insurance policy by entering a settlement agreement incorporated into an order of separate maintenance executed approximately a year prior to the father's death. At issue was whether the court of appeals erred in finding that decedent's children could maintain a state law action against the decedent's surviving spouse to recover proceeds distributed to the spouse as the beneficiary of the decedent's ERISA-governed benefits plans, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., where the state law claims were based on a contention that the spouse waived her rights to such proceeds. The court answered in the negative, concluding that, in this case, since the proceeds of the ERISA-covered plans were paid out to appellant and were no longer in the control of the plan administrator, the trial court erred when it dismissed appellees' breach of contract claim against appellant.View "Appleton v. Alcorn, et al." on Justia Law

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Parents appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that the antenuptial agreement between their son and his then-wife, Kathy L. Cox, was ineffective to waive Kathy's right to the funds in Michael's 401(k) plan. The son died before his divorce from Kathy was finalized. The parties agreed that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., governed the distribution of the funds in the plan. The court concluded that the son's designation of his Parents as beneficiaries of the plan must yield to Kathy's rights as a surviving spouse, agreeing with the district court that Kathy's consent did not satisfy the acknowledgment requirement of section 1055(c)(2)(A)(iii). View "MidAmerican v. Cox, Sr., et al." on Justia Law