Justia ERISA Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing her claims against her former employer for defamation; breach of a unilateral contract to pay a performance bonus; failure to timely pay wages after discharge in violation of Minn. Stat. 181.13(a); age discrimination; and interference with her rights to employee benefits in violation of section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1140, and the court's denial of her motion to continue the summary judgment proceedings. The court agreed with the district court that the employer was entitled to the qualified privilege as a matter of law for plaintiff's defamation claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the breach of contract and unpaid wages claims because all the employer's documents clearly stated that the awarding of bonuses was discretionary. The court further held that the district court properly granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's age discrimination claim where plaintiff failed to show that either of her replacements were "sufficiently younger" or that there was a material question of fact regarding pretext; the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of employee benefit plan interference under section 510 of ERISA; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for continuance. View "Chambers v. The Travelers Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

Abbott created Hospira for its Hospital Products Division. Before the spin-off, HPD employees had access to Abbott's pension plan. Hospira did not offer a pension plan. The spin-off included reciprocal two-year no-hire policies. When HPD employees became Hospira employees, non-vested pension rights in the Abbott plan were eliminated. Retirement-eligible HPD employees were effectively prevented from retiring from Abbott then joining Hospira. A certified class of Hospira employees alleged that violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1140, by using the spin and no-hire policy to get rid of pension liability and deter HPD employees from exercising pension benefits before the spin. They alleged that Abbott breached its fiduciary duty by failing to disclose that Hospira would not offer pension benefits. The district court entered judgment for Abbott and Hospira on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. ERISA claims failed because Abbott and Hospira did not act with the requisite intent to interfere with plaintiffs' pension benefits. The breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim failed because Abbott had nothing to do with the Hospira benefits plan and because Abbott reported truthfully to HPD employees that benefits might change after the spin. View "Nauman v. Abbott Labs., Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the district court's order dismissing plaintiffs' claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to the Railway Labor Act's (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151, 181, exclusive and mandatory dispute resolution process that applied to plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs argue that the RLA did not apply to them because they were no longer "employees" as contemplated by the RLA. Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that even if the RLA applied to them as former employees, they complied with the terms of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which allowed them to bring an action in federal district court pursuant to section 501(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. The court held that plaintiffs were employees under the RLA pursuant to Supreme Court precedent. In the alternative, plaintiffs were explicitly looking for a "contracted-for" judicial remedy following an adverse RLA-established Retirement Board ruling without showing any of the narrow exceptions to RLA exclusivity. Therefore, the court declined to depart from established precedent preventing parties from creating federal court jurisdiction where there was none. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Ballew, et al. v. Continental Airlines, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the district court dismissing as time-barred their putative class action complaint against their former employer and the employer's pension plan for benefits alleged to be due under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Plaintiffs asserted that the district court erred when it looked past the six-year New York limitations period for contract actions; applied part of the New York regime known as the "borrowing statute," which directed it to Pennsylvania law; and ruled that Pennsylvania's four-year limitations period barred plaintiffs' claims. The court held that in an action for benefits under 29 U.S.C. 1132, the court applied the forums state's statute of limitations, including its borrowing statute. Therefore, the district court was correct in applying New York's borrowing statute and plaintiffs' claims were untimely under Pennsylvania law. View "Muto, et al. v. CBS Corp." on Justia Law

DIRECTV sold business segments. In 1997 it sold defense units to Raytheon, transferring $5,774,655,148 in pension assets and $3,310,028,559 in pension liabilities, a net transfer of $2,464,626,589 in surplus pension assets. In a 2000 sale of satellite business units to Boeing, DIRECTV transferred $1,843,930,981 in pension assets and $1,037,344,156 in liabilities, a net transfer of $806,586,825 in surplus assets. In both transactions, DIRECTV retained a small portion of surplus pension assets. The Government asserted noncompliance with Cost Accounting Standard 413.50(c)(12) (41 U.S.C. 422(f)(1)), which regulates assignment of actuarial gains and losses, valuation of assets of a pension fund, and allocation of pension costs to a contractor’s business segments, and demanded payments of $68,695,891 and of $12,197,704. The Court of Federal Claims granted DIRECTV summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The claims court correctly determined that DIRECTV's segment closing obligations could be satisfied by cost savings realized by the Government in successor contracts. The court rejected arguments that the trial court erred by calculating segment closing adjustments based on assets and liabilities of the entire segment, rather than only assets and liabilities that DIRECTV retained and that the Federal Acquisition Regulation required DIRECTV itself to pay any amount due as a segment closing adjustment.View "DIRECTV Group, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of defendant, filed this action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., to challenge the termination of his long-term disability benefits. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erroneously relied on Curtis v. Nevada Bonding Corp. to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with plaintiff that Vaughn v. Bay Environmental Management, Inc. controlled in these circumstances. Whether plaintiff was a participant for purposes of ERISA was a substantive element of his claim, not a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings because plaintiff asserted a colorable claim that he was a plan participant and satisfied the threshold for establishing subject matter jurisdiction. View "Leeson v. Transamerica Disability Income Plan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff commenced this action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., claiming that the administrator of the Principal Life policies had misconstrued the policies in calculating his predisability earnings and that, with a proper calculation, his predisability earnings were far greater. The district court, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, entered judgment in favor of Principal Life. The court affirmed. Even though the court recognized that the policy language, defining those expenses that could be subtracted from gross income to arrive at predisability earnings, was somewhat confusing and, to be sure, needlessly verbose, the court concluded that the administrator's interpretation was a reasonable one. View "Fortier v. Principal Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Decedent worked for the company from 1982 until 1997, when, at age 52, he was treated for degenerative disc changes, alcohol abuse, and depression. He never returned to work and died in 2008. He was enrolled in his employer's group life, administered by defendant under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, was a participant in a long-term disability benefits plan, and had purchased an individual life insurance policy from defendant. He applied for premium waivers under the life insurance policies and received disability benefits under Social Security Disability Insurance and under the employer's plan. Defendant granted a waiver of premiums under the individual policy, but denied a waiver under the group policy. Decedent did not learn about the denial until seven years later. In 2006 and 2008, defendant again denied the application. The estate filed suit in 2010 to recover life insurance benefits and enforce rights under the group policy. The district court granted summary judgment for defendant. The First Circuit reversed, noting defendant's many mistakes in handling the claim and that defendant did not reserve to itself discretion as to interpretation and administration of its plan. Decedent was "totally disabled" for purposes of the plan. View "Scibelli v. Prudential Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment in favor of Standard Insurance in this Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., benefits case. The court held that the Plan administrator did not abuse its considerable discretion in this case where substantial evidence supported the administrator's decision. View "Carrow v. Standard Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, all "trades or businesses" under "common control" are treated as a single employer for purposes of determining withdrawal liability. 29 U.S.C. 1301(b)(1). SCOFBP incurred withdrawal liability for unfunded pension benefits in 2001 when it ceased operations and paying into a union pension fund. The district court held that the solvent MCRI and MCOF, which were part of a complex set of entities and trusts under control of a single businessman (who went through personal bankruptcy in 1999), were both trades or businesses that were under common control with insolvent SCOFBP at the relevant times, so that both are liable for SCOFBP's withdrawal liability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that MCRI and MCOF were only passive investment vehicles rather than trades or businesses and that the businessman's personal bankruptcy disrupted what had been common control of the three entities. View "Central States SE and SW Areas Pension Plan v. SCOFBP, LLC, " on Justia Law