Justia ERISA Opinion Summaries

This case concerned the withdrawal liability for a pro rata share of unfunded vested benefits to a multiemployer pension fund of Scott Brass, Inc. (SBI), a bankrupt company. SBI had withdrawal pension obligations to the multiemployer pension fund (TPF), which sought to impose the obligations on two private equity funds (Plaintiffs). Plaintiffs asserted they were passive investors that indirectly controlled SBI and sought a declaratory judgment against the TPF. The TPF counterclaimed and sought payment of the withdrawal liability at issue. The district court entered summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, holding (1) at least one of the private equity funds that operated SBI sufficiently operated and was advantaged by its relationship with SBI, and further factual development was necessary as to the other equity fund; (2) the district court erred in entering summary judgment for Plaintiffs under the "trades or businesses" aspect of a two-part "control group" test under 29 U.S.C. 1301(b)(1); and (3) the district court correctly entered summary judgment for Plaintiffs on TPF's claim of liability on the ground that the funds had engaged in a transaction to evade or avoid withdrawal liability. Remanded. View "Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund" on Justia Law

The plant’s union and TRW negotiated collective bargaining agreements, which included provisions for healthcare benefits for retirees. The last CBA became effective in 1993 and was scheduled to expire in 1996. The plant closed in 1997. TRW and the union entered into a termination agreement that provided that any beneficiary, who is receiving or entitled to receive any payment and/or benefit under the CBA, “shall continue to receive or be entitled to receive such payment and/or benefit as though the CBA and Pension Plan had remained in effect.” In 2011, TRW terminated prescription drug coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees, replacing it with an annual contribution to a health reimbursement account. Plaintiffs claimed that this change modified their benefits in violation of TRW’s contractual obligation and filed a purported class action under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185(a), and a claim for benefits under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). The district court granted TRW’s motion to compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit affirmed as to the two named Plaintiffs, declining to address the rights of hypothetical plaintiffs. View "VanPamel v. TRW Vehicle Safety Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant a former pilot for US Airways, sought benefits from a collectively-bargained pilot disability plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. On appeal, appellant challenged the district court's dismissal of his claim for lack of jurisdiction. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal because section 204 of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq., vested in the "applicable adjustment board" exclusive jurisdiction over appellant's claim because it was grounded in the application and interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. View "Oakey v. US Airways Pilots Disability Income Plan" on Justia Law

The Fund is a multi-employer trust fund under the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. 186, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. Blue Cross is a Michigan non-profit corporation; its enabling statute authorizes the State Insurance Commissioner to require it to pay a cost transfer of one percent of its “earned subscription income” to the state for use to pay costs beyond what Medicare covers. In 2002 the Fund converted to a self-funded plan, and entered into an Administrative Services Contract with Blue Cross, which states that Blue Cross is not the Plan Administrator, Plan Sponsor, or fiduciary under ERISA; its obligations are limited to processing and paying claims. In 2004 the Fund sued, claiming that Blue Cross breached ERISA fiduciary duties by imposing and failing to disclose a cost transfer subsidy fee to subsidize coverage for non-group clients. The fee was regularly collected from group clients. Self-insured clients were not always required to pay it. Following a first remand, the district court granted class certification and granted the Fund summary judgment. On a second remand, the court again granted judgment on the fee imposition claim and awarded damages of $284,970.84 plus $106,960.78 in prejudgment interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Pipefitters Local 636 Ins. Fund v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of MI" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former Lehman employees, filed suit alleging that defendants, members of the Benefits Committee, and the company's Directors, breached their duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. In regards to plaintiffs' claims that the Benefits Committee Defendants breached their duty of prudence in managing the company's employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), the court concluded that plaintiffs have not rebutted the Moench v. Robertson presumption because they failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the Benefits Committee Defendants knew or should have known that Lehman was in a "dire situation" based on information that was publicly available during the class period. In regards to plaintiffs' claims that the Benefits Committee Defendants breached their duty of disclosure, the publicly-known information available to defendants did not give rise to an independent duty to investigate Lehman's SEC filings prior to incorporating their content into a summary plan description issued to plan-participants. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining claims. View "In Re: Lehman Bros. ERISA Litig." on Justia Law

Parents appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that the antenuptial agreement between their son and his then-wife, Kathy L. Cox, was ineffective to waive Kathy's right to the funds in Michael's 401(k) plan. The son died before his divorce from Kathy was finalized. The parties agreed that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., governed the distribution of the funds in the plan. The court concluded that the son's designation of his Parents as beneficiaries of the plan must yield to Kathy's rights as a surviving spouse, agreeing with the district court that Kathy's consent did not satisfy the acknowledgment requirement of section 1055(c)(2)(A)(iii). View "MidAmerican v. Cox, Sr., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a class action suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., alleging various breaches of fiduciary duty to plan participants. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed Counts I and IV of the amended complaint which alleged that Idearc Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by allowing plan participants to buy and hold Idearc stock when it was no longer prudent to do so where the amended complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to overcome the "presumption of prudence" the court adopted in Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy Inc. The court also concluded that the district court correctly dismissed plaintiff's claim for inaccurate disclosures and nondisclosures (Count II) where plaintiff alleged no specific circumstance or specific injury mandating the Idearc Defendants disclose non-public information to plan participants and no general duty to disclose non-public information existed under ERISA or under the court's precedents. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Kopp v. Klein, et al." on Justia Law

After accumulating a fortune in the technology business, Patel became a hedge fund manager. He formed a fund, and Sitara to serve as the fund’s investment adviser, and named himself managing director of Sitara. His acquaintances purchased interests in the fund. After initial success, Patel invested $6.8 million, nearly all of the fund’s assets, in Freddie Mac common stock in 2008, after the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis. The fund incurred devastating losses. Owners of limited partnership interests sued Patel and Sitara, claiming federal and state securities fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent inducement. Their second amended complaint asserted only failure to register securities in violation of federal law, failure to register as an investment advisor under Illinois law, and breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1109(a). Plaintiffs sought to file a third amended complaint, based upon purported misrepresentations discovered while deposing Patel: an offering memorandum statement that Patel “intends to contribute no less than one hundred thousand dollars” and Patel’s oral statement that he was investing some of the $18 million from the sale of a former business at the inception of the fund. Patel did not invest any proceeds from the sale of his company at the inception. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The new claims suffered from deficiencies that rendered the proposed amendment futile. View "Shailja Gandhi Revocable Trust v. Sitara Capital Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiff filed suit against Conoco for breach of the Offer Letter and breach of its obligations under a severance plan (the Plan). The court concluded that plaintiff waived any challenge to the Trustee's application of the common law presumption of integration or Texas's parol evidence rule; plaintiff's arguments regarding his change in title were unpersuasive; plaintiff's "at will" employment argument relied on outdated and out-of-context Texas authority and was unpersuasive; the waiver was not invalid and unenforceable on account of fraud in the inducement; plaintiff ratified an alleged fraud, thereby preserving the validity and enforceability of the waiver regardless by submitting a claim to Conoco Human Resources but then continuing to work at Conoco; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), civil enforcement provision "completely preempts" plaintiff's state law claims against Conoco and the district court did not err by denying plaintiff's first motion for remand; the district court correctly denied plaintiff's renewed motion for remand; plaintiff was not entitled to recover attorneys' fees; and plaintiff waived his claim for breach of the Offer Letter, pertaining to a substantial reduction in his post-merger job position and responsibilities, for failure to plead with specificity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff. View "Clayton v. ConocoPhillips Co., et al" on Justia Law

Engleson, vice president of an Akron insurance agency, suffered from medical conditions, including Crohn’s disease and depression. He resigned in 2001 and sought long-term disability benefits from the company’s group plan, managed by Unum. Unum denied his claim weeks later, reasoning that Engleson’s clinical documentation did not establish that his symptoms were so debilitating that he was precluded from working. Unum denied an appeal in October, 2001 and a second appeal with additional supporting information in November, 2001. In 2007, Engleson returned to Ohio and to the agency, but in August, 2008, he filed another claim for disability benefits. Unum granted his request, with the date of disability denoted as August 5, 2008. Unum would not provide additional appeal review of the 2001 claim. Engleson filed suit in 2009, under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, alleging that he was not afforded a full and fair review of his claim and that Unum breached its fiduciary duties. The district court held that the three-year contractual limitations period barred the suit with respect to his 2001 claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the untimely filing was not excusable. View "Engleson v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law