Justia ERISA Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against their former employer and others under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. After the district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommended dispositions, plaintiffs appealed. The court concluded that plaintiffs have failed to set forth sufficient evidence to show that they were due more in benefits and penalties than the amount that the district court determined that they were owed; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying their requests for nonmonetary relief or in determining the reasonable attorney's fees and costs; and, therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "McDowell, et al. v. Price, et al." on Justia Law

After Respondent resigned as executive director of the Chamber of Commerce, he filed a complaint against the Chamber, alleging violations of the Wage Payment and Collection Law, among other claims. After a jury trial, the court entered judgment against the Chamber. Respondent subsequently filed a motion for an award of attorneys' fees under the Wage Payment and Collection Law. The circuit court denied Respondent's motion on remand after applying a fee-shifting analysis from ERISA cases. The court of special appeals reversed the denial of the motion, holding that the circuit court erred in applying the ERISA factors. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because ERISA and the Wage Payment and Collection Law serve distinct purposes and because their fee-shifting provisions are based on different principles, a trial court should not employ the ERISA fee-shifting test in deciding whether to award attorneys' fees. View "Ocean City Chamber of Commerce v. Barufaldi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Plan based on her failure to file the action within the applicable limitation period. The court concluded that plaintiff's right to file an Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., action accrued no later than the date her administrative appeal option expired, May 4, 2004, but plaintiff did not file the pending complaint until January 31, 2011. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's action was barred by the four-year statute of limitation. The court held that the statue of limitations was not revived. Reviving a limitation period when an insurance company reconsiders a claim after the limitation period has run would discourage reconsideration by insurers even when reconsideration might be warranted. The court rejected plaintiff's estoppel and waiver claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Gordon v. Deloitte and Touche" on Justia Law

Nicole discovered Shawn’s body in their Ohio home. Shawn had gone out drinking the night before, while Nicole spent the night at a friend’s house. The Medical Examiner’s Office reported the cause of death as “[a]sphyxia by extreme and restricted position (positional asphyxia)” and the manner of death as “[a]cute ethanol intoxication ... ACCIDENT: Prolonged and extreme hypertension of neck and torso while intoxicated.” Shawn’s blood-alcohol level at the time of autopsy was .22%. Nicole filed a $212,000 claim for accidental-death benefits with the Plan, which covers “injury” as a result of an “accident,” defined as “an unintended or unforeseeable event or occurrence which happens suddenly and violently.” No benefits will be paid if the “Covered Person [is] deemed and presumed, under the law of the locale … to be under the influence of alcohol or intoxicating liquors.” Nationwide directed denial of Nicole’s claim, citing Exclusion 12, but quoting an earlier version that provided: “The Covered Person being deemed and presumed … to be driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence…” Later, based on amended Exclusion 12, Nationwide upheld the denial; its appeals panel affirmed. Nicole filed suit, asserting claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and a common-law breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants, but agreed with Nicole that the appeals panel had breached its statutory duty to provide her with Plan-related documents upon written request, and imposed a penalty of $55 per day ($8,910). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Cultrona v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

GM provides its salaried retirees with continuing life insurance benefits under an ERISA-governed plan. MetLife issued the group life insurance policy and periodically sent letters to participants advising them of the status of their benefits. The plaintiffs, participants in the plan, allege that those letters falsely stated that their continuing life insurance benefits would remain in effect for their lives, without cost to them. GM reduced their continuing life insurance benefits as part of its 2009 Chapter 11 reorganization. The plaintiffs sued MetLife under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(2) & (a)(3) and state law. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. MetLife did not tell participants that the benefits were fully paid up or vested upon retirement, but that their benefits would be in effect for their lifetimes, which “was undeniably true under the terms of GM’s then-existing plan.” The court rejected claims of estoppel, of breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, breach of plan terms, and restitution.View "Merrill Haviland v. Metro. Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), claiming that Prudential wrongly denied him long term disability (LTD) benefits under a group policy sponsored by his former employer, Vertis. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that the plan language as confirmed by the Summary Plan Description explicitly granted Prudential discretion to interpret the plan and to determine eligibility for benefits. Prudential did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff long term disability benefits where Prudential provided plaintiff the required full and fair review before denying his first appeal. The court agreed with the district court that the subsequent medical evidence submitted with plaintiff's voluntary second appeal did not render Prudential's denial of his mandatory first appeal an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiff's motion to strike Prudential's separate appendix and Prudential's motion for leave to file a Sur-Reply Brief. View "Prezioso v. Prudential Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In the early 2000s, Raytheon underwent a major reorganization, including the sale of several business segments, including AIS, Optical, and Aerospace (segments at issue). As part of each sale, Raytheon retained the assets and liabilities of defined-benefit pension plans associated with the segments. Raytheon also calculated segment closing adjustments as required by CFR Cost Accounting Standards (CAS). Raytheon determined that some of its segments had pension surpluses, but the segments at issue had deficits. Although Raytheon paid the government its share of the surpluses, the government refused to pay its share of the deficits. Raytheon submitted certified claims for recovery of the deficits under the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7103 (2011). The contracting officer issued final decisions denying these claims, reasoning that the adjustments were subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation’s timely funding requirement, 48 CFR 31.205-6(j)(2)(i), and the deficits were therefore unallowable because Raytheon failed to fund the full amount of the pension deficits in the same year as the closings and that Raytheon’s segment closing calculations “do[] not comply with CAS 413[.]” The Claims Court awarded Raytheon $59.209,967 and rejected a claim for recovery with respect to one segment, finding that Raytheon applied the wrong asset allocation method in its adjustment calculation. The Federal Circuit affirmed.View "Raytheon Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

When Tyco Valves & Controls, L.P. decided to close one of its facilities located in Houston, Tyco offered certain employees retention agreements providing that, if the employees remained with the company through the facility’s closure, they would receive severance payments in the event they were not offered comparable employment with Tyco. After Tyco sold one of the production units located in the facility to another company, Plaintiffs, several former employees who had worked in that unit and been denied severance, filed a breach of contract action against Tyco. The trial court ruled in favor of the employees and awarded the severance pay. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974 preempted Plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claims. View "Arsenio Colorado v. Tyco Valves & Controls, L.P." on Justia Law

In 2006 Finkl, a Chicago steel producer, initiated termination of its defined benefit pension plan under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, apparently anticipating merger with another company. The Plan was amended in 2008, to include Section 11.6, a special provision for distributions in connection with the contemplated termination, to apply if a participant “ha[d] not begun to receive a benefit under the Plan at the time benefits are to be distributed on account of termination of the Plan.” In May 2008, Finkl decided not to terminate the Plan. Section 11.6 was deleted. Finkl notified the IRS that the Plan was not going to terminate. Seven Finkl employees sued, alleging that they were entitled to an immediate distribution of benefits while they were still working for Finkl and that repeal of Section 11.6 violated the anti-cutback terms of the Plan, I.R.C. 411(d)(6), and ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1054(g). The IRS sent Finkl a favorable determination letter that the Plan had retained its tax qualified status. In 2011, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s award of summary judgment to Finkl. The employees then pursued a claim in the Tax Court, which ruled that they were collaterally estopped by the Seventh Circuit decision from challenging the 2009, determination letter, which concluded that the Plan had not been terminated and continued to qualify for favorable tax treatment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Carter v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether ERISA preempted claims made under two Washington state laws designed to ensure that workers on public projects are paid for their work: chapters 39.08 and 60.28 RCW. When the Washington Supreme Court previously addressed this issue in 1994 and 2000, it held that ERISA preempted such claims. As a result of this conflict between Washington's rule and the rule followed by federal courts, the outcome of this type of case in Washington was entirely dependent on whether the lawsuit was filed in federal or state court. This has led to forum shopping, and created inconsistent and unjust results for parties in Washington. In light of the national shift in ERISA preemption jurisprudence and the persuasive reasoning underlying that shift, the Washington Court, through this opinion, joined courts across the country and held that this type of state law was not preempted by ERISA. View "W.G. Clark Constr. Co. v. Pac. Nw. Reg'l Council of Carpenters" on Justia Law