Justia ERISA Opinion Summaries

Pilots appealed the grant of summary judgment to PBGC on their claims regarding pension benefits payable under the terminated Retirement Income Plan for U.S. Airways Pilots. The court concluded that it need not resolve the parties' contentions regarding whether the PBGC was entitled to deference under Chevron when it acts as the trustee in an involuntary retirement plan termination; regardless, Pilots' claims relating to the PBGC's interpretation of 29 U.S.C. 1344 and regulations must fail; the court need not decide the level of deference due to the PBGC's interpretation of the Plan provisions because Pilots have not demonstrated Article III standing for part of one claim and their other claims failed regardless of the standard; and the court need not decide whether the decision in Davis v. PBGC regarding Pilots' request for a preliminary injunction was the law of the case on the standard of review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Davis, et al. v. PBGC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employees of Antioch, participated in an employee stock ownership, plan (ESOP). In 2003, Antioch borrowed money to buy back all stock except the stock owned by the ESOP. The buy-out left Antioch bankrupt and ESOP worthless. Plaintiffs filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, claiming breach of fiduciary duties. The district court granted the defendants summary judgments. The presumptive limitation period for violations is six years from the date of the last action constituting part of the breach or violation, but the time is shortened to three years from the time the plaintiff gained “actual knowledge of the breach or violation.” Applying the three-year limitations period, section 1113(2), the court reasoned that proxy documents given to plaintiffs at the time of the buy-out and their knowledge of Antioch’s financial affairs after the transaction gave them actual knowledge of the alleged ERISA violations. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The claims for breach of fiduciary duty do not depend only on the disclosed substantive terms of the 2003 transaction, but also depend on the processes used to evaluate, negotiate, and approve the transaction. Plaintiffs’ knowledge of the substantive terms of the buyout, therefore did not give them “actual knowledge of the breach or violation” alleged in this case. View "Fish v. Greatbanc Trust Co." on Justia Law

Hi-Lex has about 1,300 employees. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM) served as a third-party administrator (TPA) for Hi-Lex’s Health and Welfare Benefit Plan since 1991. Under the Administrative Services Contracts (ASCs) between the parties, BCBSM agreed to process healthcare claims for Hi-Lex employees and grant those employees access to BCBSM’s provider networks. BCBSM received an “administrative fee” set forth in ASC Schedule A on a per-employee, per month basis. In 1993, BCBSM implemented a new system, “retention reallocation,” to retain additional revenue. Regardless of the amount BCBSM was required to pay a hospital for a given service, it reported a higher amount that was then paid by the self-insured client. Hi-Lex allegedly was unaware of the retention reallocation until 2011, when BCBSM disclosed the fees in a letter and described them as “administrative compensation.” Hi-Lex sued, alleging breach of fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1104(a). The court awarded Hi-Lex $5,111,431 in damages and prejudgment interest of $914,241. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that: BCBSM was an ERISA fiduciary and breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA section 1104(a), that BCBSM conducted “self-dealing” in violation of section 1106(b)(1), and that Hi-Lex’s claims were not time-barred. View "Hi-Lex Controls, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of MI" on Justia Law

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee “because he has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to [the Act],” 29 U.S.C. 1140. Sexton made a one-time unsolicited internal complaint to his employer about alleged violations of the ERISA, with respect to seating employees on the company’s board of directors. About six months later, the company fired Sexton from his job as a general manager. Sexton sued in Michigan state court for violating the state Whistleblower Protection Act and for breaching his employment contract. The company invoked complete preemption under ERISA and removed the case to federal court. Sexton did not challenge the company’s removal of the case or its use of complete preemption. The district court granted the company summary judgment on the ERISA claim and declined supplemental jurisdiction over Sexton’s breach-of-contract claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that Sexton’s complaint did not amount to “giv[ing] information ... in any inquiry” under ERISA. View "Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against MetLife, alleging that MetLife abused its discretion in denying her claim to receive the proceeds of her late husband's life insurance policy under an employee-benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to MetLife. The court concluded based on the evidence - the 1991 form, the husband's will, and the November 2010 form - that MetLife did not abuse its discretion in determining that the husband's son, rather than plaintiff, was the beneficiary of the life insurance proceeds. Even assuming that the substantial-compliance doctrine was available to federal courts in the interpleader context, the court would not extend it to the circumstances presented here. Where an ERISA plan administrator is given discretion under the plan to determine eligibility for benefits, the doctrine does not deprive the administrator from requiring strict compliance with the terms of the plan. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Hall v. Metropolitan Life Ins., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the Chairman of the Trustees of the Rhode Island Bricklayers Benefits Funds (the Funds), sued Union Stone Inc., alleging that Union Stone had failed to pay the full amount of fringe benefit contributions due for work performed in Massachusetts and Connecticut by members of the International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. After a trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the Funds, awarding the unpaid contributions, interest, and attorneys' fees. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) refusing to enforce a purported settlement agreement between the parties; (2) admitting certain evidence on the ground that it was tainted by violations of the discovery rules; (3) declined to impose sanctions; and (4) awarding interest and attorneys' fees.View "Enos v. Union Stone, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1054(g). At issue was whether the anti-cutback rule in section 204(g) precluded plan amendments that reduced retirement-type subsidiaries for plan participants who have ceased employment without satisfying the preamendment conditions for the subsidy, but who could later satisfy the preamendment conditions without returning to work. The court held that the rule protected such benefits. Plaintiffs have satisfied the preamendment conditions and their benefits were protected by the anti-cutback rule. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Alcantara v. Bakery and Confectionery Union" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs worked until 2006, when the plant closed, and retired under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA); that provided that the employer would provide health insurance, either through a self-insured plan or under a group insurance policy and identified the employer’s contribution to the premium. The CBAs provided that the coverage an employee had at the time of retirement or termination at age 65 or older other than a discharge for cause “shall be continued thereafter provided that suitable arrangements for such continuation[] can be made… In the event… benefits … [are] not practicable … the Company in agreement with the Union will provide new benefits and/or coverages as closely related as possible and of equivalent value." In 2011 TRW (the employer’s successor) stated that it would discontinue group health care coverage beginning in 2012, but would be providing “Health Reimbursement Accounts” (HRAs) and would make a one-time contribution of $15,000 for each eligible retiree and eligible spouse in 2012, and in 2013, would provide a $4,800 credit to the HRAs for each eligible party. The HRAs shifted risk, and potentially costs, to plaintiffs. TRW did not commit to funding the HRAs beyond 2013. Plaintiffs sued, claiming that the change breached the CBAs, in violation of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. The district court certified a class and granted summary judgment, ruling that the CBAs established a commitment to lifetime health care benefits. The Sixth Circuit affirmed View "United Steel, Paper, Forestry, Rubber, Mfg. Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union v. Kelsey-Hayes Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was hired by Employer in 1983. Plaintiff was covered by a short-term disability plan, and the Life Insurance Company of North America (“LINA”) had the authority to decide questions of eligibility for coverage or benefits under the plan. After Plaintiff underwent back surgery in 2009, LINA at first granted but then denied Plaintiff disability benefits. In 2010, Plaintiff sued LINA, Employer, and others in Puerto Rico court, seeking review of the benefits denial. LINA later removed the action to the District of Puerto Rico. Ultimately, the district court (1) found LINA’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious because Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient medical evidence of disability, and (2) dismissed Plaintiff’s claim against Employer for failure to plead it with specificity. Plaintiff appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal on procedural grounds because Plaintiff committed numerous procedural errors, which precluded intelligent review. View "Gonzalez-Rios v. Hewlett Packard PR Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Lowe's challenging the Plan Administrator's denial of benefits under an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., Plan. The court reversed the district court's grant of relief from the denial of benefits and award of benefits because the court found that the Plan Administrator did not abuse its discretion where the Plan Administrator was not operating under a conflict of interest and was vested with the power to interpret the terms of the Plan.View "Porter v. Lowe's, et al." on Justia Law