Justia ERISA Opinion Summaries

Smith was an employee CGC, which offered some employees, including Smith, enhanced compensation if they would remain with CGC through its merger with AEGON. Under the Voluntary Employee Retention and Retirement Program (VERRP) Smith would retire in 2000. Smith elected to receive $1,066.54 under the qualified plan and $1,122.97 under the non-qualified plan, through the “AEGON USA Pension Plan: Election for Distribution and Explanation of Benefits.” An attachment informed Smith that “you will be entitled to receive additional benefits from the [CGC] Retirement Plan.” The two plans subsequently merged. Smith retired and the Plan paid him a lump sum plus $2,189.51 per month. In 2007, AEGON amended the Plan to add a “Restriction on Venue. A participant or Beneficiary shall only bring an action in connection with the Plan in Federal District Court in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.” In 2011, the Plan told Smith that it had overpaid him by $1,122.97 per month for 11 years and eliminated Smith’s entire monthly payment to obtain recoupment. Smith exhausted administrative remedies then filed suit against CGC in state court, asserting breach of contract, wage and hour statutory violations, estoppel, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. CGC removed the action to federal court, which dismissed, finding that that the VERRP was regulated by ERISA, that Smith was suing to recover benefits under this ERISA plan, and that only the Pension Committee, not CGC, was a proper defendant. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Smith filed suit against the AEGON Plan in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The district court dismissed based on the venue selection clause. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the venue selection clause as applying to all actions brought by a participant or beneficiary, not just claims for benefits. View "Roger Smith v. Aegon Companies Pension Plan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Reliance and the Plan, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., claiming that Reliance abused its discretion in denying long-term disability benefits. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiff. The court concluded that Reliance's interpretation of the Plan is reasonable. The loss-of-license provision states that the loss of a license for any reason is insufficient in and of itself to entitle a claim to benefits. In this case, plaintiff's diagnosis of diabetes mellitus was not enough by itself to justify benefits. Reliance's interpretation merely requires that the claimant show that the injury or sickness itself renders him unable to perform his occupation. Further, Reliance's determination that plaintiff was not totally disabled was supported by substantial evidence and its denial of benefits was reasonable. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Hampton v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff received benefits under her employer’s long-term disability benefit plan before the administrator for the long-term disability program determined she was no longer eligible for benefits. The administrator denied Plaintiff’s appeal as untimely for her failure to appeal within the benefit plan’s 180-day deadline. Plaintiff filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), claiming that her failure to comply with the 180-day deadline should have been excused because the benefit plan’s written instrument did not mention the deadline. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s benefits challenge as well as her two other ERISA claims for statutory penalties and for breach of fiduciary duty. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) dismissing Plaintiff’s benefits challenge, as Plaintiff failed to meet the deadline for appealing internally the decision to cut off her long-term disability benefits, and the benefit plan had expressly incorporated that deadline into the benefit plan’s written instrument; and (2) ruling that Plaintiff could not recover statutory penalties against the administrator or that she had waived her claim for breach of fiduciary duty. View "Tetreault v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Nationwide, with 32,000 employees in 49 states, has an ERISA employee-benefits plan that provides short-term disability (STD), long-term disability (LTD), and “Your Time” benefits. An employee can receive Your Time benefits for personal reasons, such as vacation or illness. To receive STD benefits, an employee must be “STD Disabled,” which means “a substantial change in medical or physical condition due to a specific illness that prevents an Eligible Associate from working their current position.” Specific rules govern maternity leave. The first five days of paid maternity leave come out of an associate’s Your Time benefits. Thereafter, a new mother is considered STD Disabled and entitled to STD benefits for six weeks following a vaginal delivery, or eight weeks following a cesarean section. Wisconsin’s Family Medical Leave Act requires that employers allow six weeks of unpaid leave following “[t]he birth of an employee’s natural child[.]” The Act’s “substitution provision” requires employers to allow an employee to substitute “paid or unpaid leave of any other type provided by the employer” for the unpaid leave provided by the statute. A Wisconsin Nationwide employee had a baby. She received six weeks of STD benefits under Nationwide’s plan. She then requested an additional period of STD benefits pursuant to the substitution provision. The plan denied the request, finding that she was no longer short-term disabled under the plan. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had held that, ERISA did not preempt the Wisconsin Act. The district court held that, under the Supremacy Clause, the administrator was required to comply with ERISA rather than the Wisconsin Act. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Sherfel v. Newson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, investors in 401(k) benefit plans, brought suit on behalf of themselves and a putative class of benefit plans and plan participants that have held or continue to hold group annuity contracts with John Hancock. They alleged that John Hancock charged excessive fees for its services in breach of its fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001. The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of the suit, holding that John Hancock was not a fiduciary with respect to the alleged breaches with respect to setting fees. View "Santomenno v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After defendant Elem suffered injuries in a car accident, she and her attorney conspired to hide and disburse settlement funds from an employee welfare benefit plan she received after the accident. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment and the district court granted summary judgment for the employer, as well as awarded attorney's fees and costs to the employer. The court affirmed, concluding that the district court had the authority to sanction defendants for their bad faith. The court also concluded that defendant's claim that the district court misapplied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70 was moot and dismissed the appeal. View "AirTran Airways, Inc. v. Elem, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her employer, Reliastar, under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., after she was denied long term disability benefits. The district court found that Reliastar's benefits determination was arbitrary and capricious, and remanded to the company to calculate the amount of benefits owed. Reliastar appealed. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, holding that the remand order is not an immediately appealable final decision under either the traditional principles of finality or the court's precedents governing remands to administrative agencies. View "Mead v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that DHL's decision to eliminate plaintiffs' right to transfer their account balances from DHL's defined contribution plan to its defined benefit plan violated the "anti-cutback" rule of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1054(g), which prohibits any amendment of an employee benefits plan that would reduce a participant's "accrued benefit." The court, agreeing with the First Circuit and the district court, concluded that DHL's 2004 plan amendment did not, as a matter of law, violate the anti-cutback rule. The reduction of periodic benefits paid from the Retirement Income Plan that resulted from DHL's elimination of the transfer option did not violate section 1054(g)(1) where the accrued benefits of both the defined contribution and the defined benefit plan remained intact. The court further concluded that the 2004 amendment did not violate the anti-cutback rule as a matter of law where this case fits within the regulatory exception for elimination of an "optional form of benefit," even if the transfer option was such a benefit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Andersen v. DHL Retirement Pension Plan" on Justia Law

Two trustees of the Fund filed suit under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185(a), and section 515 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1145, to collect unpaid benefit contributions allegedly owed by Goebel. On appeal, the Trustees challenged the dismissal of the ERISA claim. The court read the Trust Agreement to unambiguously require that an employee is actually represented by the Union at the time the Fund claims delinquent contributions were owed on behalf of that employee. As it is undisputed that the Union did not "represent" the employees at the times in question, the Trustees failed to demonstrate the Fund was entitled to the contributions they seek under the terms of the Trust Agreement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Goebel. View "Kern, et al. v. Goebel Fixture Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the fiduciary implications of a life insurance company’s decision to pay benefits through a retained asset account (RAA) that allows the insurance company to invest the retained assets for its own profit. In Merrimon v. Unum Life Insurance Co., decided also this year, the First Circuit held that an insurer, acting in the place and stead of a plan administrator, properly discharges its duties under ERISA when it pays a death benefit by establishing an RAA as long as that method of payment is called for by the terms of the particular employee welfare benefit plan. In this case, Appellant alleged that an Insurer’s use of RAAs as a method of paying death benefits transgressed its ERISA-inspired fiduciary duties. The district court granted summary judgment in the Insurer’s favor. The First Circuit affirmed largely on the basis of its opinion in Merrimon, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the Insurer’s choice to pay by means of an RAA did not violate its fiduciary duties. View "Luitgaren v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada " on Justia Law