Justia ERISA Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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Plaintiff is a former federal employee and participant in a health-insurance plan (“Plan”) that is governed by the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (“FEHBA”). The Plan stems from a contract between the federal Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) and Blue Cross Blue Shield Association and certain of its affiliates (together, “Blue Cross”). Blue Cross administers the Plan under OPM’s supervision. Plaintiff suffered from cancer, and she asked Blue Cross whether the Plan would cover the proton therapy that her physicians recommended. Blue Cross told her the Plan did not cover that treatment. So Plaintiff chose to receive a different type of radiation treatment, one that the Plan did cover. The second-choice treatment eliminated cancer, but it also caused devastating side effects. Plaintiff then sued OPM and Blue Cross, claiming that the Plan actually does cover proton therapy. As against OPM, she seeks the “benefits” that she wanted but did not receive, as well as an injunction directing OPM to compel Blue Cross to reform its internal processes by, among other things, covering proton therapy in the Plan going forward. As against Blue Cross, she seeks monetary damages under Texas common law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s suit.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that neither the advance process nor the proton-therapy guideline poses an immediate threat of injury, so injunctive relief is therefore unavailable. Further, the court found that FEHBA preempts Plaintiff’s common-law claims against Blue Cross. Accordingly, the court held that no relief is available under the relevant statutory and regulatory regime. View "Gonzalez v. Blue Cross Blue Shield" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs brought a class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), arguing that Defendant Colgate-Palmolive Co. miscalculated residual annuities based on an erroneous interpretation of its retirement income plan and improperly used a pre-retirement mortality discount to calculate residual annuities, thereby working an impermissible forfeiture of benefits under ERISA. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs on these claims. Colgate appealed that order and the final judgment of the district court.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the text of the RAA is unambiguous and requires Colgate to calculate a member's residual annuity by subtracting the AE of LS from that member's winning annuity under Appendix C Section 2(b). Further, the court wrote that Colgate's "same-benefit" argument does not disturb our conclusion that the RAA's language is unambiguous. Because "unambiguous language in an ERISA plan must be interpreted and enforced in accordance with its plain meaning," the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the class Plaintiffs as to Error 1. View "McCutcheon v. Colgate-Palmolive Co." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, current and former employees of RingCentral, participated in RingCentral’s employee welfare benefits plan. The plan participated in the “Tech Benefits Program” administered by Sequoia Benefits and Insurance Services, LLC, a management and insurance brokerage company. The Tech Benefits Program was a MEWA that pooled assets from employer-sponsored plans into a trust fund for the purpose of obtaining insurance benefits for employees at large-group rates. Plaintiffs filed this putative class action on behalf of the RingCentral plan and other Tech Benefits Program participants, asserting that Sequoia owed fiduciary duties to the plan under ERISA because Sequoia allegedly exercised control over plan assets through its operation of the Tech Benefits Program. Plaintiffs alleged that Sequoia violated its fiduciary duties by receiving and retaining commission payments from insurers, which Plaintiffs regarded as kickbacks, and by negotiating allegedly excessive administrative fees with insurers, leading to higher commissions for Sequoia.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of Article III standing. The court held that Plaintiffs failed to establish Article III standing as to either of their two theories of injury. The panel held, as to the out-of-pocket-injury theory, Plaintiffs failed to establish the injury in fact required for Article III standing because their allegations did not demonstrate that they paid higher contributions because of Sequoia’s allegedly wrongful conduct. And Plaintiffs failed to plead the third element, that their injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief. View "RACHAEL WINSOR, ET AL V. SEQUOIA BENEFITS & INSURANCE, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sued Minnesota Life Insurance Company and Securian Life Insurance Company, alleging that their denial of her claim for life insurance benefits violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). The district court dismissed her complaint under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s Section 1132(a)(3) claim. First, her contention that Minnesota Life and Securian failed to notify her husband of his conversion right does not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty because the terms of her husband’s policy did not require notice, and Plaintiff points to no provision of ERISA that would require such notice. Second, her assertion that Minnesota Life and Securian misrepresented that her husband’s conversion window would be extended rests on a misreading of the February 24 letter; Minnesota Life and Securian made no such representation. View "Kristina Powell v. Minnesota Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs-Appellees, emergency care physician groups in Texas (the “Plaintiff Doctors”), have provided various emergency medical services to patients enrolled in health insurance plans insured by Defendants-Appellants UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company or UnitedHealthcare of Texas, Incorporated (collectively, “UHC”). The Plaintiff Doctors are not within UHC’s provider network. In their operative complaint, the Plaintiff Doctors allege (among other claims) that UHC has failed to remit the “usual and customary rate” for the emergency care that the Plaintiff Doctors provide to patients insured by UHC in violation of the Emergency Care Statutes. UHC moved to dismiss the Plaintiff Doctors’ complaint, which was denied in part by the district court. The district court rejected UHC’s argument that the Emergency Care Statutes did not authorize a private cause of action. UHC immediately sought interlocutory review of two issues: (1) whether the Emergency Care Statutes authorize an implied private cause of action, and (2) whether the Plaintiff Doctors’ claim under the Emergency Care Statutes is otherwise preempted by ERISA.   The Texas Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that the Texas Insurance Code “does not create a private cause of action for claims under the Emergency Care Statutes.” Therefore, the Fifth Circuit found that the Plaintiff Doctors’ claim for violation of the Emergency Care Statutes must be dismissed. Because there is no private cause of action under the Emergency Care Statutes, the second issue before the court—whether the Plaintiff Doctors’ claim under the Emergency Care Statutes is otherwise preempted by ERISA—is now moot. View "ACS Primary v. UnitedHealthcare" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Robert Harrison, a participant in a defined contribution retirement plan established by his former employer, filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) against the fiduciaries of the plan alleging that they breached their duties towards, and caused damages to, the plan. Harrison sought various forms of relief, including a declaration that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties, the removal of the current plan trustee, the appointment of a new fiduciary to manage the plan, an order directing the current trustee to restore all losses to the plan that resulted from the fiduciary breaches, and an order directing Defendants to disgorge the profits they obtained from their fiduciary breaches. Defendants moved to compel arbitration, citing a provision of the plan document. The district court denied that motion, concluding that enforcing the arbitration provision of the plan would prevent Harrison from effectively vindicating the statutory remedies sought in his complaint. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found no reversible error in the district court’s ruling and affirmed. View "Harrison v. Envision Management Holding, Inc. Board, et al." on Justia Law

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Gragg worked as a driver for 31 years. For the first 26 years, he was an employee of Overnite; after UPS acquired Overnite, he was an employee of UPS. In 2008, UPS reclassified his position from nonunion to union, so that two different pension plans funded his pension. In 2010, each plan sent him information indicating that, after Gragg turned 65, each plan would reduce his monthly payment by $1754, which was the anticipated amount of his Social Security benefit. Gragg turned 65 in 2018. The following month, each plan reduced the amount of Gragg’s monthly benefit by the entire amount of his Social Security benefit—for a combined monthly reduction of $3508. Gragg’s overall monthly income declined by $1754, rather than remaining stable as promised by the letters. Gragg filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B).The district court held Gragg’s suit was barred by a six-year limitations period, having accrued when he received the letters. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The letters did not cause the injury upon which Gragg sued; the underpayments did. Before that injury, his claim had not accrued. An ERISA claim based on the letters alone would have rested upon “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” View "Gragg v. UPS Pension Plan" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff alleged that a participant loan program that Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America (TIAA) offered to her retirement plan is a prohibited transaction under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). After ruling that Haley’s suit could proceed against TIAA as a nonfiduciary under ERISA, the district court certified a class of employee benefit plans whose fiduciaries contracted with TIAA to offer loans that were secured by a participant’s retirement savings. TIAA argues that the district court erred when it found that common issues predominated over individual ones without addressing the effect of ERISA’s statutory exemptions on liability classwide and without making any factual findings as to the similarities of the loans.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s decision holding that the predominance inquiry of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) requires that a district court analyze defenses, and the court did not do so here. Further, because the predominance inquiry of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) requires that a district court analyze defenses, and the court did not do so here, the district court did not analyze the exemptions, it also did not engage with the evidence that TIAA submitted to substantiate the purported variations among the plans. A district court cannot simply “take the plaintiff’s word that no material differences exist.” View "Haley v. TIAA" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff challenged Lincoln’s denial of her claim for long-term disability benefits. On de novo review, the district court affirmed Lincoln’s denial of Plaintiff's claim, but it adopted new rationales that the ERISA plan administrator did not rely on during the administrative process. Specifically, the district court found for the first time that Plaintiff was not credible and that she had failed to supply objective evidence to support her claim.The Ninth Circuit held that when a district court reviews de novo a plan administrator’s denial of benefits, it examines the administrative record without deference to the administrator’s conclusions to determine whether the administrator erred in denying benefits. The district court’s task is to determine whether the plan administrator’s decision is supported by the record, not to engage in a new determination of whether the claimant is disabled. Accordingly, the district court must examine only the rationales the plan administrator relied on in denying benefits and cannot adopt new rationales that the claimant had no opportunity to respond to during the administrative process.Here, the district court erred because it relied on new rationales to affirm the denial of benefits. View "VICKI COLLIER V. LINCOLN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY" on Justia Law

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In December 2019, Coastline JX Holdings LLC (Coastline), assignee of a judgment creditor’s interest in a money judgment entered against Stephen Bennett, served on Seamount Financial Group, Inc. (Seamount) a notice of levy on Bennett’s assets in an individual retirement account and a profit-sharing plan. After the trial court ordered Seamount to liquidate Bennett’s interest in both assets and turn them over to the levying officer to be delivered to Coastline, Bennett moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s order under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. In his motion, Bennett first argued to the trial court that the profit-sharing plan was protected from levy because it qualified as a plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). He also filed a motion to tax costs. The trial court denied Bennett’s motion, but informed the parties that, under its inherent authority, it would reconsider its prior order regarding the distribution of the profit-sharing plan only (not the individual retirement account) because the court previously had not considered the implications of it being an ERISA-compliant plan. After a hearing on the court’s own motion, the court reversed its prior decision and concluded the profit-sharing plan was exempt from levy due to preemption by ERISA. The court ordered Coastline to reimburse the profit-sharing plan any funds it had received under the court’s prior order. The trial court also denied Bennett’s motion to tax costs and the request for attorney fees that was included in his supplemental briefing. Coastline and Bennett each appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order and rejected each of the parties’ arguments on appeal. View "Coastline JX Holdings LLC v. Bennett" on Justia Law