Justia ERISA Opinion Summaries

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Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against the Investment Committee of the Phillips 66's retirement plan for breach of fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The Fifth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' contention that defendants breached their duty to diversify under section 1104(a)(1)(C) of ERISA and their duty of prudence under section 1104(a)(1)(B) by failing to consider reducing their holdings in the ConocoPhillips Funds. Although plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the ConocoPhillips Funds, by its resulting concentration of investment, became an imprudent investment with the spinoff, the court held that it does not follow that defendants were obligated to force plan participants to divest from the funds. Furthermore, by closing the ConocoPhillips Funds to new investments immediately after the spin-off, defendants also ensured that they were not offering participants an imprudent investment option. Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the district court erred in dismissing their claim that defendants failed to comply with their duty "to follow a regular, appropriate, systematic procedure to evaluate the ConocoPhillips Funds as investments in the Plan." Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. View "Schweitzer v. Investment Committee of the Phillips 66 Savings Plan" on Justia Law

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Three retirement-plan participants field suit against WashU for breach of its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that fees were too high and that WashU should have negotiated a better deal. The court held that a failure of effort or competence is enough to state a claim for breach of the duty of prudence. In this case, two inferences of mismanagement are plausible from the WashU's failure to offer more institutional shares. However, the court held that plaintiffs' claims that WashU had several underperforming investments in the plan for too long was properly dismissed, because the allegations failed to establish a meaningful benchmark for evaluating the challenged options. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Davis v. Washington University in St. Louis" on Justia Law

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This dispute arose from Humana's denial of coverage for plaintiff's hospital stay as not "medically necessary" for treatment of an eating disorder. The Fifth Circuit reviewed Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) claims such as this one under the framework set forth in Ariana M. v. Humana Health Plan of Texas, Inc., 884 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc). The court limited its review of the coverage decision to the administrative record and applied de novo review. The court held that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether plaintiff met the Mihalik Criteria (ED.PM.4.2 sub-criteria) which precluded summary judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Katherine P. v. Humana Health Plan, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2014, Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston rejected the claim for long-term disability benefits by plaintiff-appellee Michael Ellis. As part of its employee-benefit plan, Comcast Corporation, for whom Ellis worked in Colorado from 1994 until 2012, had obtained from Liberty in 2005 a Group Disability Income Policy (the Policy). Ellis sought review of Liberty’s denial of benefits in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The district court, reviewing the denial de novo, ruled that Liberty’s denial was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Liberty appealed, contending the court should have reviewed its decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard but that it should prevail even under a de novo standard. Ellis defended the district court’s choice of a de novo standard but argued he should prevail under either standard of review. The Tenth Circuit determined a plan administrator’s denial of benefits was ordinarily reviewed by the court de novo; but if the policy gave the administrator discretion to interpret the plan and award benefits, judicial review was for abuse of discretion. The Policy at issue provided that it was governed by the law of Pennsylvania, which was where Comcast was incorporated and has its principal place of business. Among its terms was one that gave Liberty discretion in resolving claims for benefits. A Colorado statute enacted in 2008, however, forbade such grants of discretion in insurance policies. The parties disputed whether the statute applied to the Policy under Colorado law, and whether Colorado law governed. The Tenth Circuit held that in this dispute the law of Pennsylvania was controlling. Liberty’s denial of benefits was therefore properly reviewed for abuse of discretion. Under that standard the denial had to be upheld. View "Ellis v. Liberty Life Assurance Co" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants, holding that the trial court erred by entering summary judgment for defendant health-insurance plans, which were governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), based on ERISA preemption. Plaintiff, a health-care provider, contracted with two third-party networks. Defendants and its affiliated employee health-insurance plans contacted with both health networks. Seven patients received treatments from Plaintiff, and the patients were covered under Defendants' plans. Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging that they failed to pay agreed reimbursement rates for covered services under their plans. The trial court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff, concluding that Plaintiff's claims were preempted under ERISA's conflict-preemption provision, 29 U.S.C. 1144(a). The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that genuine issues of disputed fact existed concerning the central issue of whether the provider's claims were denied coverage under the plans or whether the provider's claims necessitated interpreting the plan documents. View "FMS Nephrology Partners North Central Indiana Dialysis Centers, LLC v. Meritain Health, Inc." on Justia Law

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The First Circuit held that the New Hampshire Judicial Retirement Plan (Plan) does not allow a former judge who resigned with sufficient years of creditable service, but before reaching the minimum retirement age, to receive a Service Retirement Allowance (SRA) upon later reaching the retirement age. Plaintiff was fifty-four years old when she resigned from her position as a superior court justice for the state of New Hampshire. Plaintiff served in that position for sixteen-and-a-half years. At the age of sixty-one, Plaintiff applied for an SRA. The Board of Trustees of the Board of Trustees (Board) of the Plan denied her application. Plaintiff filed suit against the Plan seeking a declaratory judgment that she was eligible for an SRA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Plan as to Plaintiff's claim for violation of N.H. Rev. Stat. 100-C, 5, concluding that the plain language of the statute requires a judge to be in active service when she elects to retire and claim a service retirement allowance. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff was not eligible to receive an SRA on her application. View "Coffey v. New Hampshire Judicial Retirement Plan" on Justia Law

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Wallace participated in Oakwood’s employee welfare benefit plan, which provided long-term disability (LTD) benefits, subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001. Effective January 1, 2013, Oakwood switched the insurer responsible for that plan from Hartford to Reliance. Wallace took medical leave in October 2012, returning to work in April 2013. Wallace took medical leave again in May 2013 and has not returned to work. Reliance denied her claim for LTD benefits citing the pre-existing condition provision of its plan document and describing the review process, including that “failure to request a review within 180 days … may constitute a failure to exhaust the administrative remedies … and may affect ability to bring a civil action.” The plan document did not describe the review process or an exhaustion requirement. After discussions with Reliance, Wallace submitted an unsuccessful claim to Hartford. Wallace filed suit under ERISA. The district court granted Wallace judgment against Reliance based on the administrative record. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of Reliance’s motion to dismiss on the basis of exhaustion. A plan document must detail claims review procedures and remedies. The court vacated the judgment on the record; further fact-finding is necessary to determine whether Wallace was eligible for LTD benefits and in what amount. Wallace may have been covered under transfer of insurance and pre-existing conditions limitation credit provisions, but the record does not permit a definitive finding. View "Wallace v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a class action against Travelport and the Galileo & Worldspan U.S. Legacy Pension Plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, alleging claims for improperly withheld pension benefits, document-disclosure penalties, and breach of fiduciary duties. The district court dismissed all claims. With respect to plaintiff's claim for benefits, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded for the district court to review her claim anew after Travelport has certified and submitted the complete and accurate administrative record. The court reversed the district court's award of attorney's fees, but otherwise affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Williamson v. Travelport, LP" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against Mercy Health, alleging that Mercy's plan management disregards requirements under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Mercy asserted that it does not have to comply with ERISA's requirements because the plan falls under ERISA's church-plan exemption pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 1003(b)(2). The Eighth Circuit held that whether a plan is an ERISA plan is an element of the plaintiff's case and not a jurisdictional inquiry. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. The court remanded to the district court to determine whether the deprivation of ERISA protections confers Article III standing, and if so, whether the church-plan exemption violates the Establishment Clause. If there is Article III standing, the state law claims should be reinstated pursuant to the court's supplemental jurisdiction. View "Sanzone v. Mercy Health" on Justia Law

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Under the Retirement Plan, participating Northwestern University employees can contribute a portion of their salary to their account and Northwestern makes a matching contribution. Employees participating in the Voluntary Savings Plan also contribute a portion of their salary, but Northwestern does not make a matching contribution. Both plans allow participants to choose the investments for their accounts from options assembled by the plans’ fiduciaries. Northwestern is the administrator and designated fiduciary of both plans. The plaintiffs sued Northwestern under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001 (ERISA). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the amended complaint and rejection of the plaintiffs’ demand for a jury trial. Under the plans, no participant was required to invest in any particular product. Any participant could avoid the alleged problems with certain products--record-keeping fees and underperformance. Northwestern provided a wide range of investment options and provided prudent explanations for the challenged fiduciary decisions involving alleged losses. There was no ERISA violation with Northwestern’s record-keeping arrangement; the plaintiffs identified no alternative recordkeeper that would have accepted any fee lower than what was paid nor have they explained how a hypothetical lower-cost recordkeeper would perform at the level necessary to serve the best interests of the plans. View "Divane v. Northwestern University" on Justia Law